5 measures of protection of each one of them, whenever are met the two requisites of the "extreme gravity and urgency" and of the prevention of "irreparable damage to persons", set forth in Article 63(2) of the Convention. 15. As to the protected rights, I understand that the extreme gravity of the problem of uprootedness brings about the extension of the application of the provisional measures not only to the rights to life and to personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention) but also to the rights to personal liberty, to the special protection of the children in the family, and to circulation and residence (Articles 7, 19 and 22 of the Convention), as in the present case of the Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic. This is the first time in its history that the Court proceeds in this way, in my view correctly, aware of the necessity to develop, by its evolutive case-law, new means of protection inspired in the reality of the intensity of human suffering itself. 16. The present Resolution of the Court reveals, furthermore, that the concept of project of life, recently dealt with in the exercise of its contentious function pertaining both to the merits ("Street Children" case, Judgment of 19.11.1999) and to reparations (Loayza Tamayo case, Judgment of 27.11.1998), marks likewise presence at the level of provisional measures of protection, as ensued from the facts alleged by the Delegations of both the Dominican Republic and the Inter-American Commission, as well as by the two witnesses presented by this latter, in the public hearing before the Court of 08 August 2000. 17. One ought to bear always in mind the evolution of the provisional measures of protection, which have their historical roots in the precautionary process (proceso cautelar) at the level of the internal legal order, originally conceived to safeguard the effectiveness of the jurisdictional function itself. Gradually the autonomy of the precautionary action (acción cautelar)14 was affirmed, having reached the international level in the arbitral and judicial practice. The rationale of the provisional measures did not change substantially with this transposition to the level of Public International Law, in which they continued to seek the preservation of the rights claimed by the parties and the integrity of the decision as to the merits of the case. The change of the object of such measures only took place with the impact of the emergencie of the International Law of Human Rights15. 18. With their transposition from the ambit of the traditional inter-State contentieux to that of the International Law of Human Rights, the provisional measures began to beyond, in the matter of protection, revealing a scope without precedents, in moving on to protect the sustantive rights themselves of the human beings, to the extent that they seek to avoid irreparable damages to the human person as subject of the International Law of Human Rights. The human being is taken as such, irrespective of the colectivity which he belongs to. This gradual evolution concerning provisional measures of protection is nowadays consolidated, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has surely contributed to that more than any other contemporary international tribunal. 14 . Mainly due to the contribution of the Italian procedural law doctrine of the first half of the XXth century, in particular the well-known works by G. Chiovenda (Istituzioni di Diritto Processuale Civile, 1936), P. Calamandrei (Introduzione allo Studio Sistematico dei Provvedimenti Cautelare, 1936), and F. Carnelutti (Diritto e Processo, 1958). 15 . Such as I seek to demonstrate in my Preface to volume II of the Compendium of Provisional Measures (June 1996 - June 2000) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (pp. VII-XVIII).