on the truck accident, the Joint Investigation Board justified the competence of the military jurisdiction based on the said article 3. This report was subsequently forwarded by the Secretary of the Armed Forces to the prosecutor of the Court Martial of First Instance and served as the basis for the court order to open proceedings before the Court Martial of First Instance (supra para. 59). 211. Subsequently, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Dominican Republic confirmed the competence of the military jurisdiction, using articles 28 of Law No. 834 of July 15, 1978, 271 and 382 of the 1884 Code of Criminal Procedure, as justification.272 In other words, the Supreme Court did not analyze the said norms and article 3 of Law No. 3483 in light of the American Convention and the Court’s case law starting with the case of Durand and Ugarte,273 regarding the lack of competence of the military criminal jurisdiction to try human rights violations and the restrictive and exceptional scope that it must have in the States that still retain this jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is important to underscore that this Court had already established that, owing to the legal right violated, the military jurisdiction is not the competent jurisdiction to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations and that, in the military jurisdiction, only active members of the armed forces can be judged for committing crimes or offenses that, owing to their nature, affect legal rights of the armed forces. 274 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that both the actions of the military officials during the investigation and the prosecution of the case in the military jurisdiction, and those of the ordinary domestic courts, represented a clear failure to comply with the obligation contained in Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 8 and 25 of this instrument. 1. Legislative reform 212. The State has informed this Court about changes made in the constitutional and legislative norms between 2002 and 2012. 213. At the legislative level, the 2002 Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates:275 Article 57. The criminal jurisdiction shall have universal and exclusive competence to hear and rule on all punishable acts and omissions established in the Criminal Code and in the special criminal legislation, and for the execution of its judgments and decisions, pursuant to this code. The procedural norms established in this code apply to the investigation, hearing and deciding of any punishable act, regardless of its nature or that of the accused, including members of the Armed Forces and the National Police, even when the offenses attributed to them have been committed in the exercise of their functions and without prejudice to the strictly disciplinary powers of the institutions to which they belong. […] 271 Law No. 834 of July 15, 1978: Art. 28: If a litigation is pending before two jurisdiction of the same level that are equally competent to hear it, the second jurisdiction empowered must relinquish competence in favor of the other one if one of the parties requests this. If now, it may do so ex officio. 272 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1884: Art. 382: “In criminal or correctional matters, the Supreme Court of Justice may appoint judges, and in simple police matters, the first instance courts may do so, provide that the investigating judges and the correctional and criminal courts, as well as the police courts, which do not depend on each other, are informed of the same crime or related crimes or of the same contravention. 273 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Merits, supra, paras. 116, 117, 125 and 126, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 240. 274 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 128, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 240. 275 Dominican Code of Criminal Procedure, Law No. 76/02, of July 19, 2002 (file of annexes to the State’s final written arguments, tome VII, folio 3753). The Court also notes that the Code of Criminal Procedure only entered into force 24 months after its publication; in other words, on July 19, 2004, and only for cases that were initiated as of that date. See art. 499. Final Provisions. (i) Entry into force. This Code shall enter into force 24 months after its publication and shall apply to cases initiated after the expiry of this time frame. 57