additional penalty of disqualification from holding public office, and other penalties. He stated that he tried unsuccessfully to appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Caracas Metropolitan Area, and also filed a petition for cassation with the Venezuelan Supreme Court. He further stated that from the beginning, and throughout the criminal proceedings, he was subject to a precautionary measure that barred him from leaving the country, and that this measure was extended during the period of probation that was imposed as a condition for the suspension of his sentence. 14. The petitioner asserted that these facts amount to a violation of his right to freedom of expression, recognized in Article 13 of the American Convention. The petitioner alleged, based on the case law of the Inter-American Human Rights System, that the trial court’s judgment—which was later upheld by the court of appeals and the Court of Cassation—violated the right to freedom of thought and expression enshrined in Article 13 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 thereof. He indicated that the objective of the prosecution was to silence his newspaper and prevent the publication of his opinion columns. The petitioner maintained that the mission was accomplished, due to his resignation as a columnist from the newspaper Así es la Noticia, the departure of the paper’s director, and the subsequent cessation of its activities. He asserted that, as evidenced by the psychological and social assessments performed, he does not wish to continue writing because of the risk it entails for him and his family. He added that the conviction also violated his civil rights. He explained that he was sentenced to the additional penalty of disqualification from holding public office during the period of his sentence. This additional penalty resulted, according to Article 24 of the Criminal Code of Venezuela, in his being barred from public or political office or employment and the inability, for the duration of the sentence, to obtain other employment and to enjoy the right to vote and to run for office. The petitioner further stated that the political disqualification made him like a foreigner in his own country, unable to exercise his citizenship, or any mechanism of political participation or representation. 15. The petitioner stated that his case was the first time a precautionary measure ordering the defendant not to leave the country was issued in a criminal defamation case in Venezuela. According to the petitioner, the law requires the court to examine and verify the defendant’s risk of flight prior to issuing a substitute precautionary measure such as the prohibition of foreign travel. Under Venezuelan law, this flight risk can only be presumed in cases of crimes punishable by more than 10 years in prison. Therefore, the party requesting this type of measure bears the burden of proof, and according to the petitioner, the complainant limited himself to requesting the measure without stating the grounds for the request. The petitioner alleged that he requested permission to leave the country three times, that his first two requests were denied, and the third request went unanswered. He further indicated that even though he was granted a conditional suspension of the execution of his sentence on December 20, 2007, notice of that decision was not given to the immigration authorities. As a result, his name continued to appear in the police and national customs service registries at airports, and he had to continue to request prior authorization from the courts in order to travel. The petitioner alleged that the foreign travel ban had interfered with his professional and teaching activities, family life, and the exercise of his freedom of expression. He stated that his work entailed meetings abroad with clients and those potential professional and academic opportunities had been frustrated as a result of the ban. He also indicated that his wife and daughters had been subjected to interrogations and intimidating tactics every time they traveled outside Venezuela. 16. The petitioner also alleged the violation of his right to a fair trial and maintained that the judge who presided over the criminal complaint against him had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a case that can only be prosecuted at the victim’s request [juicio de acción privada] and that, therefore, he should have transferred the complaint to a trial court. He also stated that the trial court judge decided to classify the complaint as a “private prosecution,” in spite of the fact that it contained “every imaginable defect,” and granted the complainant 5 days to cure those defects, in violation of the petitioner’s right to a defense. 17. The petitioner stated that the criminal action against him was barred by the statute of limitations from the beginning, since one year had elapsed between the May 23, 2003 event that gave rise to the complaint and the June 11, 2004 summons to trial. He asserted that dismissed the allegation that the statute of limitations had expired without giving the petitioner an opportunity to prove it. He further stated that during the proceedings he was prevented from presenting evidence to oppose the numerous amendments to the complaint that the other party was allowed. According to the petitioner, this kept him from setting forth