the exercise of the social dimension of freedom of expression, and the consequent need for the State to adopt measures for its effective protection. 5 4. Similarly, and fundamentally, the judgment reflects on the importance of the State adopting measures to combat oligopolies in media ownership. This obligation of the State constitutes one of the ways to guarantee the principle by which "freedom of expression goes further than the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or to write. It also includes and cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium” 6 offers effective access to the least represented groups in society. This is so because avoiding the concentration of the media in a few hands allows minority voices in society, or those who do not have the economic resources that allow them to compete with the large media groups, to have access to spaces for public participation. Avoiding this concentration democratizes access to the media and allows a pluralism of ideas in society, strengthening democracy and increasing the effectiveness of the exercise of freedom of expression. Of course, the judgment recognizes that the fight against oligopolies can never be a reason to affect the human rights of those who work or own said media. 7 5. In this context, the judgment pronounces on how the protection of journalism cannot be differentiated from freedom of expression, since the journalist is a person who has decided to exercise their freedom of expression in a constant and remunerated manner. Journalists must enjoy freedom, and protection by the State, to be able to collect and disseminate opinions, information and ideas, even more so when they are of public interest. For this reason, the Court has established in its case law that measures restricting the exercise of journalism also obstruct freedom of expression. At this point it should be added, and the judgment refers to this matter, that the work of journalists in society not only constitutes an exercise of the freedom of expression of those who carry out said activity, but also of those who receive that information. Thus, the protection of journalists is constituted as an aspect of the social dimension of freedom of expression, for which it requires special consideration and protection of the right. 8 6. Hence, the judgment highlights that the recurrence of public officials before judicial instances to present actions for crimes against good name, honor or reputation, such as slander or insult, represents a threat against freedom of expression when the objective of the lawsuit is to silence the criticism that is made of them, even more so when it is aimed at de facto censoring journalists or media outlets critical of the government. 9 Later in this opinion we will refer to this particular issue, but it is important to highlight how these complaints or actions, when presented by the authorities with the aim of de facto sanctioning or censoring a media outlet or a journalist, as in fact what happened in the present case with the lawsuit filed against Mr. Palacio Urrutia and the directors of the newspaper, constitute a particularly serious incident with respect to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression protects both the person who sends the message and the person who receives or knows said information. 5 Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 93-94. Cf. Compulsory membership in an association prescribed by law for the practice of journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5. 6 7 Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 93. 8 Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 94. 9 Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 95. 2