II.3. Institutional Consequences II.3.a. Acts of the Provisional Council 32. According to the information in the public domain regarding the exercise of the functions assigned to the Executive Branch as a result of the aforementioned consultation, as well as the facts that the Commission now declares in principle with sufficient grounds to admit the case, plus those that were recently reported to the United Nations Rapporteur and those that the State admitted when responding to its requirements, the irreparable damage to the institutionality derived from the way in which the Executive exercised the powers attributed to it by the aforementioned consultation is evident. 33. In effect, the Executive at the time removed the councilors whose mandate expired in the year 2020 and replaced them with a Provisional Council, formally appointed by the Legislature, but from short lists previously sent by the executive, without the legislature being able to appoint any other person outside those proposed by the executive in the three lists, with the fact that it held the majority in the Assembly being noteworthy. 34. Everything seems to indicate that the members of that Provisional Council assumed and exercised powers not conferred on it by the Constitution, with which they removed, shortened the mandates or in some way released the judges of the Constitutional Court. They removed the councilors from the Judicial Council, appointed new councilors with the mission of evaluating judges and then interfered in the body’s actions by stopping the selection process. 35. Thus, in principle it follows that the consultation was convened and was carried out without the constitutional control of the Constitutional Court and, based on that consultation, the executive appointed a new Provisional Council that in some way would have removed the Constitutional Court judges who had not undertaken enabling control of the consultation. 36. It is more than obvious that the Court’s case law has always been extremely thorough, paying attention to the removal of magistrates, especially from supreme and constitutional courts, as in the cases of Peru and other States. 12 Although the case has not been raised, this does not mean the Court can ignore these episodes of high institutional volume when framing the case. 37. Given that the Provisional Council also appointed a new Council of the Judiciary, which was charged with evaluating and removing judges, the replacement of the councilors arranged by the executive empowered to do so by consultation, directly or indirectly, made the judges’ dismissal possible and somehow the appointment of new judges by selection process was suspended, allowing the tenure of temporary judges, that is, there would be an institutional abnormality that would seriously compromise the independence of the Judiciary and the very principle of the natural judge. 38. It should be noted that the Provisional Council nominated by the executive based on the consultation, also dismissed the Attorney General, that is, the head of the Public Prosecution and called for a selection process to appoint the new head who carried out the allegations against the previous government officials of who identified 12 Cf. Case of Cuya Lavy et al. v. Perú, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of September 28, 2021, Series C No. 438; Case of Moya Solís v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of June 3, 2021, Series C No. 425; Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment of August 19, 2021, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 429. 6