4 victim. In compliance with the decree, Mr. García Lucero was escorted to the airport on June 12, 1975, where he left for the United Kingdom. He and his family live there to this day. 15. On April 8, 1978, the then Military Government issued Decree-Law 2191, which, according to the petitioners, “legitimized and legalized impunity in Chile for the commission of crimes against humanity during the dictatorship and thereafter,” by granting amnesty to all persons who had committed criminal acts during the military dictatorship. The petitioners contend that while the Supreme Court and various appeals courts have, since 2007, been more consistent in finding that Decree-Law No. 2191 cannot be applied, it still remains in force. The petitioners argue that the courts’ position with regard to cases of torture is unclear; by October 2008, only two verdicts had been handed down that held that the decree did not apply to persons who committed acts of torture during the dictatorship. The petitioners further maintain that the fact that the decree remains in force is an obstacle for Mr. García Lucero to have access to effective judicial remedies for the investigation, prosecution and punishment of the acts of torture, in violation of the right recognized under Article 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. They further contend that the Amnesty Decree prevents victims from seeking compensation before civil courts. 16. The petitioners also presented various arguments having to do with Chilean law. They contend, first, that Chile has not adapted the crime of “torment” in its laws to conform to international standards. More specifically, the petitioners allege that in Chile, this offense is criminalized under Articles 150A and 150B of the Chilean Criminal Code and Article 330 of the Military Code of Criminal Justice. The petitioners contend that these provisions have the following problems: none uses the terms “torture” or “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”’; they apply only in the case of persons deprived of liberty, do not include an attempt to commit torture, and set 10 years as the statute of limitations, in violation of international law which holds that the crime of torture, being a crime against humanity, is not subject to a statute of limitations. The petitioners also allege that according to the domestic laws and regulations acts of torture committed by members of the Army or police officers are to be investigated in the military criminal justice system. In conclusion, the petitioners contend that these provisions of Chilean domestic law violate Articles 2 and 8(1) of the American Convention. 17. As for access to adequate reparations, the petitioners state that once democratic order was restored in Chile in 1990, a period of transition led to a number of reforms, including reforms to the domestic reparations system. However, the petitioners point to a number of obstacles that prevent the alleged victim from obtaining adequate and full compensation. First, in Chile the only way for obtaining compensation for acts of torture is under the provisions of the Criminal Code that concern torts. According to the petitioners, the crime of torture is treated as a simple wrongful act leading to liability, which is incompatible with Article 25 of the American Convention, as it does not constitute an adequate and effective legal remedy; it is also a violation of Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, in which States undertake to incorporate into their national laws regulations guaranteeing suitable compensation for victims of torture. Second, a civil suit within the criminal courts or civil courts is futile in a case of torture since, under Chilean law, the defendants must be identified –which is virtually impossible in cases of torture. The situation is even further complicated by the Amnesty Law. Third, the petitioners contend that because the Chilean Judiciary has not been consistent in its position on this subject, the question of whether civil claims to seek reparations are time barred or not renders the alleged victim’s right to adequate compensation illusory. 18. The petitioners argue that the report of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (the “Valech Commission”), which identifies Mr. Garcia Lucero as a victim, is not in itself a comprehensive measure of reparation. Specifically, they contend that this report reveals the atrocities reported by more than 35,000 Chileans, but omits the names of the