second committee sent an official letter to the same official and to the
same effect on May 15, 2002.
15.
With respect to violation of the constitutional preference given to labor
obligations, the petitioners stated that despite the decision in their favor, through
various emergency decrees such as Decree No. 030-94, the government on several
occasions authorized the transfer of real states and movable assets from ECASA to
various companies that were creditors of the State.
16.
The petitioners mentioned in general terms the approval of Law
27803 on the Review of Collective Dismissals, seeking to “cut off” fringe benefits
earned and not satisfied by any government administration. This law establishes four
articles allowing terminated individuals to have recourse either to reinstatement or
relocation without recognition of accrued salary payments; to early retirement; to
financial compensation or $3,000 or less; or employment retraining or training.
17.
They reported that they again had recourse to the judicial branch in
an attempt to receive justice from the new government, 2 but that their situation
remained unchanged.
B.
Position of the State
18.
The State provided a summary of the facts submitted by the petitioner,
indicating that the 90/91 Collective Agreement between ECASA and SUTECASA was
signed on June 25, 1990 and that the government issued Decrees 057-90-TR and
107-90-PCM in August 1990, suspending the compensation increases established by
unilateral decision of the employer or under the Collective Agreement. The State
added that ECASA was declared dissolved and liquidated by Decree 085-91-PCM of
April 23, 1991 and that on May 27, 1991 ECASA asked for police forces to prevent
the entry of workers who had not accepted the resignation with incentive that had
been offered, forcing the resignation of 3,905 workers, who they terminated six
months later, ignoring the agreements reached under the 90/91 Collective
Agreement.
19.
The State presented its version – corresponding to that of the
petitioners – regarding other actions taken by SUTECASA before the Legislative and
Executive Branches to achieve enforcement of the court decision in their favor.
According to the State’s version, these bodies concluded that, in compliance with the
Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice, the members of SUTECASA should be paid
the money owed for fringe benefits.
20.
Regarding the judicial process, the Peruvian State indicated that in
August 1990 SUTECASA filed an action for constitutional protection against the Office
of the President of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the
Ministry of Labor, and ECASA with the First Temporary Business Court of Public Law,
seeking to have Decrees 057-90-TR and 107-90-PCM declared inapplicable and, as a
result, declaring the Single Salary Schedule and the Collective Agreement to be in
force.
21.
The State specified that on February 16, 1993 the Supreme Court of
Justice declared the referenced decrees inapplicable to the ECASA workers, which
decision became final on June 25, 1996 when the Constitutional Court, declaring the
appeal inadmissible, declared the decision of the Supreme Court to be solid and
enforceable. The State emphasized that when the complaint was brought before the
2 Communication received on August 30, 2003.