Inter-American Commission, the process was open in the Specialized Court of Public Law, in the decision execution phase. 22. The State related that at this phase of the execution of the decision, the court ordered that expert analysis be performed in order to establish whether between May 1990 and April 1991, ECASA had complied with the increases contemplated in the Collective Agreement signed by SUTECASA for that period. It mentioned that the expert testimony was issued on September 6, 1998, concluding that Decrees 057-90-TR and 107-90-PCM were not applied to the members of SUTECASA and that the analysis had not been able to determine the existence of amounts due in their favor. It added that this expert testimony was approved by the Chamber for Public Law on December 18, 1998, that on January 14, 1999 the Court of Public Law declared the appeals process complete, and that this final decision was confirmed by the Chamber of Public Law on February 12, 1999 after ruling on the appeal filed by SUTECASA. 23. According to the State, this decision indicates “that the declarative legal question that is the subject of the appeal for constitutional protection had been converted into a question of fact and a claim to payment, and that if the complainants felt that ECASA did not pay them the amount to which they felt they were entitled, given the inapplicability of the aforementioned Executive Decrees that are the subject of the complaint, they had sought to enforce the payment of compensation owed, leaving unharmed the right of the Union members to demand that this be done in the appropriate manner and using the appropriate means.” 24. The State argued that the decision on the constitutional appeal cannot be enforced for purposes of payment, since an ordinary process should be conducted first so that a judge can rule that a debt exists, on the amount thereof, and who is obligated to pay it. The State emphasized that the subject of the constitutional appeal process was the applicability of Decrees 057-90-TR and 107-90-PCM, so that enforcement was exhausted by ordering and confirming that inapplicability, which was clearly seen in the expert testimony in the process of executing the decision. 25. The State added that on December 31, 2003 SUTECASA filed a Proceeding for Enforcement of a Final Court Decision with the 13 th Labor Court of Lima, asking that the court order the payment of 180,811,430.37 new soles to the claimants. It specified that that proceeding concluded with the resolution of December 7, 2004, whereby the Second Labor Chamber of Lima declared the entire proceeding null and the complaint with respect to execution of a final court decision inadmissible, arguing that, according to Law No. 23506, the judges of the First Instance Court for Civil Matters are competent to hear the constitutional appeal action and thus labor judges are not competent to hear cases with respect to the execution of resolutions issued in constitutional appeal proceedings. 26. The Peruvian State requested that the petition be declared inadmissible based on the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, since although SUTECASA “was successful in a constitutional appeal proceeding that ruled in favor of all the workers in the union, the petitioners’ claim for payment is not possible except through an ordinary labor proceeding.” In the State’s opinion, the petitioners did not use the appropriate venue for filing its action to enforce its right to claim payment. The State concluded that “it is the absolute responsibility of the petitioners to have filed a constitutional proceeding that although ruling in favor of the petitioners, cannot be enforced in order to bring about the payment they claim.” 27. The State concluded that the appeal for constitutional protection filed by SUTECASA concluded after having been handled according to the law and adhering to the rules of due process. In addition, the State indicated that the facts reported