140. The State’s obligation to guarantee rights goes beyond the relationship between its agents and the persons under its jurisdiction; it also encompasses the obligation to prevent, within the private sphere, third parties from violating protected juridical rights. 236 However, according to the Court’s case law, it is clear that a State cannot be held responsible for all the human rights violations committed by private individuals within its jurisdiction. Indeed, the nature of the State’s treaty-based guarantee obligations does not imply its unlimited responsibility for all acts or deeds by private parties. The State’s duty to adopt measures of prevention and protection for private individuals in their relationships with each other is conditioned by its knowledge of a situation of real and immediate danger to an individual or a specific group of individuals - or that it should have known of a such a situation 237 - and by the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. In other words, even though an act or omission by an individual may have the legal consequence of violating the specific human rights of another individual, this cannot be automatically attributed to the State, because the particular circumstances of the case and the application of these guarantee obligations must be taken into account. 238 Accordingly, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to attribute responsibility to the State in this specific case. 141. This Court has also established that, in addition to the general obligations to respect and guarantee rights, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Convention, special obligations are derived from these, which are determined according to the particular needs for protection of the subject of law, either owing to his personal situation or to the specific situation in which he finds himself. 239 In this regard, the Court recalls that in certain situations, the States have the obligation to adopt all necessary and reasonable measures to guarantee the right to life, personal liberty and personal integrity of individuals who find themselves in situations of special vulnerability, particularly as a consequence of their work, whenever the State is aware of a situation of real and immediate danger, and has reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. 240 142. The Court reiterates that the defense of human rights can be exercised freely only when the persons engaged in it are not victims of any threats or any type of physical, psychological or moral aggression, or other forms of harassment. 241 Therefore, it is the State’s obligation not only to create the legal and formal conditions, but also to ensure the real conditions in which human rights defenders can freely carry out their work. 242 Furthermore, the States should provide the necessary means for persons who are defenders of human rights or who perform a public function, so that when they encounter threats or situations of risk or report human rights violations, they can freely carry out their activities; protect them when they receive threats so as to prevent attacks on their lives and integrity; create conditions to eradicate violations by State agents or private individuals; refrain from hindering their work, and thoroughly and effectively investigating violations committed against them, combating impunity. 243 Finally, the State’s obligation 236 Cf. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 111, and Case of Luna López v. Honduras, supra, para. 120. 237 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para.123, and Case of Luna López v. Honduras, supra, para. 123. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has established that: “[…] not every claimed risk can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materializing. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew, or should have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual […] from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk […]”Cf. ECHR, Case Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 22492/93, Judgment of March 28, 2000, paras. 62 and 63, and ECHR, Osman v. United Kingdom, No. 23452/94, Judgment of October 28, 1998, paras. 115 and 116. 238 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 123, and Case Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 21, 2013. Series C No. 261, para. 129. 239 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 111, and Case of Castillo González v. Venezuela, supra, para. 123. 240 Cf. Case of Luna López v. Honduras, supra, para. 123. 241 Cf. IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, supra, para. 46. 242 Cf. Case of García and Relatives v. Guatemala, supra, para. 182. 243 Cf. Case of Nogueira de Carvalho et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections and Merits. Judgment of November 28, 2006. Series C No. 161, para. 77, and Case of Luna López v. Honduras, supra, para. 123. See also, United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 39/2012 (Belarus), UN Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/39, November 23, 2012, para. 45, Available at: 44