A.2. Considerations of the Court 36. First, the Court recalls that an individual’s access to the Inter-American System for the protection of human rights cannot be restricted based on the requirement to have a legal representative; 26 if an application were not admitted for lack of a representative, this would constitute an unwarranted restriction that would deprive the alleged victim of the possibility of access to justice. 27 Indeed, the appointment of a legal representative in proceedings before the Court is the right of the alleged victims, and not an obligation. 28 In this regard, Article 35 of the Court’s Rules states that, “if applicable”, the Commission must include the names, addresses, telephone number, electronic address and facsimile number of the duly accredited representatives of the alleged victims. Article 37 of the Rules states that “[i]n cases where alleged victims are acting without duly accredited legal representation, the Court may, on its own motion, appoint an Inter-American Defender to represent them during the processing of the case.” Thus, the possibility exists that alleged victims or their relatives may not have appointed representatives, and that the omission of this information does not imply the rejection of the case, but rather the possibility that the Court may appoint an Inter-American Defender de officio. 37. Furthermore, the Court has stated that the powers granted by the alleged victims to be represented in proceedings before the Court are not necessarily bound by the same formalities required under the domestic laws of the respondent State. 29 In its consistent practice, this Court has allowed a certain flexibility in matters of representation. However, this latitude in accepting instruments granting representation has certain limits, dictated by the practical purpose that the representation itself is intended to serve. First, such instruments must clearly identify the person granting the power of attorney and include an error-free statement of intent. They must also clearly name the party to whom the power of attorney is granted and, finally, they must specify the purpose of the representation. In the opinion of this Court, instruments that meet these requirements are valid and take full effect upon presentation to the Court. 30 Thus, regardless of what the instrument is called – power of attorney, letter of attorney, authorization or any other term – any document wherein the persons grating the power of attorney express their desire to be represented, is sufficient to be legitimate for this Court. 31 38. The Court confirms that, during the proceeding before the Inter-American Commission, Claudia Samayoa Pineda and B.A., daughter of A.A. and presumed victim, submitted the initial application, 32 and jointly signed several briefs in their role as petitioners. 33 Furthermore, they presented other briefs separately. 34 In turn, D.A., E.A., B.A., F.A., G.A. and H.A., children of A.A. and alleged victims, signed a brief which was submitted on May 14, 2012, 35 in which they told the Commission: To conclude, we wish to appeal to your humanity, so that justice may be done through you and the case may be referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. We ratify that everything stated by [B.A.] and Claudia Samayoa as petitioners in this case reflects our feelings and views. Consequently, we do not want a friendly settlement but a process of justice. 39. Subsequently, in the proceeding before the Court, the Commission explained in its submission brief that B.A. and Claudia Samayoa had acted as petitioners throughout the process. On September 19, 2012, these individuals were asked to confirm whether they 26 Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 82. 27 Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra, para. 86. 28 Cf. Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 143, and Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra, para. 86. 29 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, paras. 97 and 98, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010. Series C No. 218, para. 54. 30 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, supra, paras. 98 and 99, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 54. 31 Cf. Case of Castillo Páez v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, para. 65. 32 Cf. Brief of December 9, 2005 (File of the proceedings before the Commission, pages 444 to 449). 33 Briefs of June 6 and September 19, 2008, January 22, April 27, June 23 and October 22, 2009, January 5 and October 27, 2010, January 18 and August 8, 2011, January 18 and 14 May 2012. (File of the proceedings before the Commission, pages 1, 37, 294, 298, 339, 366, 386, 130, 132, 128, 233, 274, 608). 34 Cf. Briefs of August 24, 2006, October 5, 2010, February 14, August 8, 2011 and June 4, 2012 (File of the proceedings before the Commission, pages 47, 120, 238, 414 and 526). 35 Cf. Brief of May 2012 (File of the proceedings before the Commission, pages 605 to 607). 13