that situation, since impunity fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations, and total defenselessness of victims and their relatives. 89 39. As Luis Greco explains, "impunity" does not describe the mere "absence of punishment", but rather the "absence of punishment where it should be imposed." 90 I understand that such a condition is embodied in two requirements: Criminal Law must only be mobilized (i) in cases of strict necessity and (ii) within the quadrants of due legal process, with all its guarantees. 40. First, I will address the criterion of strict necessity, already addressed in my reasoned opinion in the case of Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica (2022). When debating the "absolute exceptionality of the use of criminal measures", 91 I recall Roxin's teachings that Criminal Law is only the last of all means of social solution for a given problem, constituting the "ultima ratio of social policy" and serving as subsidiary protection of legal rights. 92 41. Thus, returning to the words of Luis Greco, the duty to punish only arises in the absence of alternatives: If the foundation of the duty to punish is the duty to protect human rights (...), this protection is based on the nature of a crime that is clam, for which the punishment represents a value. It becomes, therefore, an empirical quest that is the most indicated, and it is impossible to exclude in advance the existence of other more adequate methods. What matters, however, is whether the State succeeds or fails to comply with its duty to actively protect human rights without criminal law. A need to punish will hardly arise when these alternative methods are insufficient. The fact that human rights require the State to provide active protection does not mean that this protection has to be given only by Criminal Law. A need to punish will hardly arise when these alternative methods are insufficient. The fact that human rights require the State to provide active protection does not mean that this protection has to be given only by Criminal Law. 93 42. The criterion of strict necessity in the application of criminal measures is widely recognized in the case law of this Court and is a strong hallmark of its rulings on freedom of expression. In my reasoned opinion in Moya Chacón et al. v. Costa Rica (2022), I highlighted “a clear and growing tendency [in case law] to increasingly restrict the use of criminal solutions to protect conduct relating to the exercise of freedom of expression”, 94 since “criminal law cannot be used to sanction any type of 89 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 173. 90 Cf. GRECO, Luis. ‘Por que inexistem deveres absolutos de punir.’ Católica Law Review, v. 3 (2007), p. 121 (our translation). 91 Cf. Caso Moya Chacón vs. Costa Rica. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 23 de mayo de 2022. Serie C No. 451, voto razonado del Juez Rodrigo Mudrovitsch, párr. 5. 92 Cf. ROXIN, Claus. Derecho penal: parte general - tomo I. Fundamentos: las estructuras de la teoría del delito. (Criminal law: general part - volume I. Fundamentals: the structures of the theory of crime.) Trad. Diego-Manuel Luzón Peña et al. Madrid: Civitas, 1997, p. 65. In its entirety: “Criminal law is only the last of all the protective measures that must be considered, that is to say that it can only be made to intervene when other means of social solution to the problem– such as civil action, police or legal-technical regulations, non-criminal sanctions, etc.— fail. For this reason, punishment is called the 'ultima ratio of social policy' and its mission is defined as subsidiary protection of legal rights. This limitation of criminal law follows from the principle of proportionality of the rule of law of our Constitution: Since criminal law makes the harshest of all state interferences with a citizen’s freedom possible, it can only be made to intervene when other less harsh means do not promise sufficient success.” (our translation) 93 Cf. GRECO, Luis. ‘Por que inexistem deveres absolutos de punir.’ Católica Law Review, v. 3 (2007), p. 121. 94 Cf. Case of Moya Chacón v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 23, 2022. Series C No. 451, reasoned opinión of Judge Rodrigo Mudrovitsch, para. 25. 14