to the criminal offense, in such a way that does not incur the penalty of acts that are not punishable in the legal system. 98 46. The Court's concern about the dangers inherent in the movement of the repressive criminal system was evident, for example, in the case of Fermín Ramírez vs. Guatemala (2005), in which the Court considered that invoking the author's dangerousness as an aggravating factor in the criminal process violated the rights of the accused: This citing (...) clearly constitutes an expression of the exercise of the state’s ius puniendi over the basis of the personal characteristics of the agent and not the act committed, that is, it substitutes the Criminal System based on the crime committed, proper of the criminal system of a democratic society, for a Criminal System based on the situation of the perpetrator, which opens the door to authoritarianism precisely in a subject in which the juridical rights of greatest hierarchy are at stake. (...) In the end, the individual will be punished – even with the death penalty – not based on what he has done, but on what he is. It is not even necessary to weigh in the implications, which are evident, of this return to the past, absolutely unacceptable from the point of view of human rights. 99 47. This recognition of prisoners in criminal proceedings as true subjects of law endowed with freedoms and human rights is precisely what differentiates the "justice cascade" initiated at the end of the Second World War from the politically biased persecutory trials that were common practice in the past. 100 Thus, it is evident that it is the strict link between the actions of States in the criminal field and Human Rights - by adherence to the principle of the ultima ratio of Criminal Law and respect for judicial guarantees - which makes aspects of the relationship compatible with Criminal Law, which is both "shield" and "sword". c. Partial conclusion 48. The discussion in this section demonstrates that the imperative to maintain Criminal Law as ultima ratio does not mean that its applicability is non-existent or that it cannot, under any circumstances, be mobilized as an instrument to protect human rights. It means, rather, that the apparent paradox between the fields requires careful consideration between the fight against impunity and all procedural guarantees and the human rights of the accused. At the end of the day, “[t]he conflict (…) was never one of Human Rights against Criminal Law per se, but rather with the abuse of the latter”. 101 It also means that the punishment of persons responsible for human rights violations does not have a merely symbolic or metaphysical value, but rather fulfills a function of reparation and prevention of future violations (as explained supra, paras. 19-28). 49. In a manner consistent with its aims and objectives, this Court understands the risks involved in the management of the criminal apparatus by the States, such as the 98 Cf. Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 79-8 99 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 94-5. 100 Cf. SIKKINK, Kathryn. The Justice Cascade: how human rights prosecutions are changing world politics. Nova York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011. 101 Cf. CALDERÓN, Jean Paul; MÉGRET, Frédéric. “Penalization” of human rights?: Twists and paradoxes in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Law & Society (Derecho & Sociedad), v. 47 (2016), p. 17. 16