to the petitioners' submission that the appointment process for members of the Jury violated the guarantee of an impartial tribunal because the Board's members are elected on a case-by-case basis and are not tenured, the State argued that the right to be heard by a competent tribunal has to do not with the tenure of the individuals in the post but with the preexistence of the adjudicatory body. It added that Mr. Rico was heard by a tribunal established prior to his accusation. 29. As to the submission that his right to a hearing with fair trial guarantees was impaired by the fact that the President of the Jury extended the preliminary discovery period (etapa de información sumaria) by 15 days, the State said that the petitioners did not explain how that extension affected the alleged victim's rights. It added that the petitioners also failed to argue how the additional charges, the rejection of the applications for nullity presented, and the evidence offered by the accused affected the alleged victim's right of defense. The State alleged in general terms that in accordance with the practice and caselaw of the interAmerican system, the assessment of evidence made by domestic tribunals is not susceptible to review by an international tribunal. 30. It argued that there had been no violation of the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court, saying that it was not a criminal proceeding, but a political one that was susceptible to judicial review provided that the interested party accredited a violation of due process, which had not happened in this case. It added that the right of appeal applies to criminal proceedings, but excludes proceedings before the Impeachment Jury. 31. The State said that it had not violated the right to judicial protection, arguing that Mr. Rico appeared to be confusing an unfavorable decision with the lack of a ruling by a judicial body. However, it said that the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, in rejecting the motion for reconsideration of dismissal of appeal, examined the violations denounced by the alleged victim and decided that they were not demonstrated in the proceeding. 32. The State argued that it had not violated the principle of legality, saying that Mr. Rico was dismissed exclusively for the causes envisaged in paragraphs e, f, and k of Article 21 of Law 8085 of the Province of Buenos Aires, which referred, respectively, to reiterated incompetence or negligence demonstrated in the performance of official duties, reiterated failure to perform the official duties inherent to the post, and reiterated allowance of procedural deadlines to lapse without pronouncing on the matters submitted for a decision or an opinion. IV. PROVEN FACTS A. Regarding Eduardo Rico 33. The petitioners said that the alleged victim served as a judge in 1970s and was terminated from his judgeship in August 1976 as a "result of the advent of the military regime in March 1976," which entailed the dismissal of large numbers of constitutionally elected magistrates. 34. According to information provided by both parties, the alleged victim was reinstated in the judiciary in 1996. There is no dispute over the fact that at the time of the events alleged in the petition he was serving as a judge on the Sixth Labor Tribunal of the Judicial Department of San Isidro. B. Regarding the legal framework applicable to the impeachment of judges in the Province of Buenos Aires 35. As the next section explains in detail, the alleged victim was dismissed and declared ineligible for service in the judiciary as a result of a punitive proceeding before an impeachment jury governed by the Argentine National Constitution, the Constitution of the Province of Buenos Aires and Law 8085 (Rules of Procedure for the Impeachment Judges).