11 40. Another premise for the exercise of the principle of reasonable time, always in favor of the effective protection of human rights and the efficient implementation of the consequences of this protection, relates to the proceeding, in its broadest sense, that the State must undertake against those responsible for facts that violate fundamental rights, in order to comply with the much-cited obligation to provide criminal justice. The latter is framed within the access of the victim to the legal remedies established by the State. If this access is impeded, or conditioned to numerous or unattainable requirements, or if there is excessive delay, the norm ensuring that all persons have the right that the determination of their rights and obligations shall be made within a reasonable time is violated. Evidently, the final juridical situation of the victim and his successors, if applicable, may depend on the decision adopted by the State in the proceeding to prosecute the unlawful conduct. 41. The timeliness in deciding a matter, using the procedures established in the State’s legal proceedings, must be examined from the perspective of different factors that may explain the delays that could arise, as noted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which has been used by the Inter-American Court. The Court has established a principle that originates in European case law: complexity of the case, processing of the proceeding by the authorities, exercise of the right of defense, among other elements that merit consideration (cf. Genie Lacayo case, Judgment of January 29, 1997 (Nicaragua). Series C, No. 30, para. 77, which invokes Eur Court H.R., Motta judgement of 19 February 1991, Series A, num. 195-A, para. 30, and Ruiz Mateos v. Spain judgement of 23 June 1993, Series A, No. 262, para. 30. Also, cf. the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001, Series C No. 79, para. 134, and the Constitutional Court (Aguirre Roca, Rey Terry and Revoredo Marsano v. Peru), Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C No. 71, para. 843. Among the more recent cases, I should mention that the problem of reasonable time has also been considered in Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of June 21, 2002, paras. 143 and ff.) and reiterated in recent judgments; observing the complexity of the case, the procedural activities of the interested party, and the conduct of the judicial authorities. 42. However, this protracted delay may, in itself, fragrantly violate the principle of reasonable time, irrespective of these indicative considerations. In one case, the Inter-American Court considered that five years would more than correspond to reasonable time (Genie Lacayo case, Judgment of January 29, 1997, Series C No. 30, para. 81) and, in another, it considered that a period of fifty months “far exceeds the ‘reasonable time’ contemplated in the American Convention” (Suárez Rosero case, Judgment of November 12, 1997, cit., Series C No. 35, para. 73). As I have already said, the principle of reasonableness, with its natural temporal references, encompasses not only the proceeding against any individual, but also the proceeding to comply with the obligation of criminal justice entailed by a judgment on reparations. In the instant case, the duration of the proceeding, with all its implications and different aspects, has been more than double these periods, without a final decision being pronounced. At “the time of this judgment, after more than 13 years, the criminal proceeding is underway and the remedy of cassation is pending a decision, so that the final judgment that will decide on and punish those responsible for the extrajudicial execution of Myrna Mack Chang has still not been rendered” (para. 272). VII. “AGGRAVATED” RESPONSIBILITY