14 Separate concurring opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez in ICourtHR, Bámaca Velásquez case, Judgment of November 25, 2000, Series C No. 70, 2001, pp. 171 and ff., paras. 2 to 5). 51. In law, the victim is the person who suffer injury to the juridical possession protected by a right or freedom with the necessary relevance to appear in the elevated category of “human or fundamental” rights. Article 63(1) of the Convention, which provides a framework for the Court’s decisions on reparations, which, in turn, are a prominent chapter of the system to protect human rights – without reparations, the latter would be deprived of practical effects – indicates that, if it finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom, the Court “shall rule that the injured party [Sp. lesionado] be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party” [Sp. la parte lesionada] (emphasis added). 52. As can be seen, the American Convention identifies the active subject of the violation as the “injured person” [Note: see the Spanish version above] or the “injured party”, that is, as a person (according to the term used in Article 1(1) of the Pact of San José) who suffers the injury (violation, infringement, reduction: in brief, an attack on, not merely the danger of the affecting) of a possession – due to the violation of a right or freedom established in the Convention – and, thus becomes a “party” in a litigation (I allude to party in the substantive sense and to litigation as a substantive datum prior to the proceeding, a measures that is part of it, following the “Carneluttiana” terminology), where the State and the injured person come face to face, even though, in the procedural dispute, the parties act in a formal sense which the Convention itself recognizes. In the terms of Article 63(1), the guarantee of the right or freedom violated corresponds to the injured person and the payment of the compensation – which, as the Court’s case law has reiterated, is one, but not the only type of reparation – to the injured party. 53. The Rules of Procedure of the Court, adopted in 2000 and in force today, define the “victim” and the “alleged victim.” Thus, the term victim refers to “the person whose rights have been violated, according to a judgment pronounced by the Court” (Article 2(31)), and alleged victim refers to “the person whose rights under the Convention are alleged to have been violated” (Article 2(30)). It is obvious that, according to these Rules of Procedure, the concepts of victim and alleged victim are the same as injured person or injured party, on the one hand, and alleged injured person or alleged injured party, on the other. Although the Convention does not use the term alleged, this provides a natural designation for the individual who has been indicated as a victim, while awaiting delivery of the decision that transforms this procedural and preliminary designation into a confirmed and final juridical classification. Thus, the relationship that I mentioned above between injured person and injured party, on the one hand, and compensation, on the other, is also established as regards victim or alleged victim and compensation. 54. However, the Rules of Procedure of 2000 (the fourth Rules of Procedure in the history of the Inter-American Court), which have expanded the role of individuals before the Court, bringing the substantive part and the procedural part increasingly closer – to the extent allowed within the procedural framework of the Pact of San José – has included references to the next of kin. This expression refers to the “immediate family, that is, the direct ascendants and descendants, siblings, spouses, or permanent companions, or those determined by the Court, if applicable” (who may be linked to the direct and immediate victim by a reasonably close relationship,