principle of legality and observing the greatest rigor when verifying the existence of punishable conduct.”9 [italics added]. 16. In that case, the IACtHR considered that the dismissal decisions issued against the victims “lacked adequate reasoning, precisely because they did not explain adequately the relationship between the acts that constituted a punishable conduct or behavior and the norms that were presumably violated.”10 In addition, it indicated that “[f]aced with the multiplicity of norms cited by the domestic organs that intervened in the disciplinary proceedings […] this Court considers that it is not incumbent on it to choose those that are best suited to the conducts of the […] victims in order to determine whether or not they meet the requirements of precision and clarity called for by the principle of legality for norms of a punitive nature.” The IACtHR concluded that, at least in that case, “it is not possible to make a detailed analysis of the requirement of the substantive legality of the norms supposedly violated, owing to the absence of a statement of reasons” [italics added].11 17. In paragraph 272 of the judgment in the case of López Lone et al., the IACtHR, referring back to paragraph 257,12 reiterated that “even though it may be admitted that the precision required in matters of disciplinary sanctions is less than in criminal matters, the use of open assumptions or vague concepts […] requires the establishment of objective criteria that guide the interpretation or content that should be given to such concepts in order to limit discretion in the application of sanctions.”13 On that occasion, this ruling was made in relation to punishable conducts. 18. In the opinion of the Inter-American Court:14 272. Such criteria can be established [i] by law or [ii] by means of interpretation in light of case law that places these concepts within the context, purpose and objective of the norm, in order to avoid the arbitrary use of such assumptions, based on the personal and private opinions or prejudices of the judges when they are applied. 273. In this regard, the Court recalls that the purpose of disciplinary control is to assess the conduct, suitability and performance of the judge as a public official. Thus, the disciplinary regulations for judges should be aimed at protecting the judicial function and, therefore, to assess the performance of the judge in the exercise of his or her functions. Accordingly, when applying open or indeterminate disciplinary norms that require considering [indeterminate] concepts, it is essential to take into account Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 270. 9 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 270. 10 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 271. 11 12 In this regard, in the said paragraph the Inter-American Court indicated that: “257.The Court has established that Article 9 of the American Convention, which establishes the principle of legality, is applicable to matters pertaining to administrative sanctions. In this regard, it should be recalled that, administrative sanctions, like criminal sanctions, are an expression of the punitive powers of the State and, at times, they are of a similar nature to criminal sanctions because both of them entail impairment, deprivation or alteration of human rights. Consequently, in a democratic system, it is necessary to take special care to ensure that such measures are adopted strictly respecting the basic rights of the individual and following a careful verification of the effective existence of a wrongful conduct. Furthermore, in the interest of legal certainty, it is essential that the norm establishing the sanction exists and is known or can be known before the act or omission occurs that violates it and that it is sought to sanction. Accordingly, the Court considers that the principle of legality also applies to disciplinary matters, even though its scope depends greatly on the matter regulated. The precision of a norm establishing a sanction of a disciplinary nature may be different from that required by the principle of legality in a criminal matter, owing to the nature of the disputes that each one is designed to resolve.” Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 272. 13 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, paras. 272 and 273. 14