the effects that the conduct examined could have on the exercise of the judicial function, either positively by the establishment of normative criteria for its application or by means of an adequate interpretation and statement of reasons by the judges when applying them. To the contrary, the scope of these disciplinary measures would be subject to the private or moral beliefs of the judges (bold and italics added). 19. Thus, what the case of López Lone et al., establishes is that: (i) the level of precision called for in criminal laws is not required in disciplinary proceedings; (ii) open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses are permitted; (iii) however, this requires the establishment of objective criteria that guide the interpretation or content that should be given to such concepts in order to evaluate the substantive legality; (iv) these criteria may be established by law or by jurisprudential interpretation. Also, adding to what was indicated in the said case, the objective criteria would need to be established beforehand – in other words, predictable15 – so that the disciplinary body could have elements for substantiation and interpretation when applying them and providing a statement of reasons. Even though the latter element was not addressed in the case, due to the specific particularities of the matter, it is fundamental to ensure that members of the judiciary have certainty vis-à-vis the potential application of open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses. 20. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the statement of reasons in disciplinary proceedings in which the maximum sanctions are applied to members of the judiciary must include specific elements in order to be considered adequate substantiation (such as, including the reasoning behind the pre-existing jurisprudential or interpretive criteria). The IACtHR did not analyze this matter on the occasions of the case of López Lone et al., because, as indicated “there was no statement of reasons.” 21. That the precision of a law of a punitive nature is or may be different – as has been recognized by the Inter-American Court – from that required by the principle of legality in criminal matters (a question related to rigor and clarity), does not automatically exempt the State from the obligation to draw up prior objective criteria and to place a limit on the possible arbitrary application of the said norms, either by law or by interpretation. II. 22. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN THE CORDERO BERNAL CASE As indicated in the judgment, the IACtHR has stipulated that judicial independence gives rise to guarantees: (a) to tenure and irremovability from office; (b) to an adequate process of appointment, and (c) to be protected from external pressures. Regarding the guarantee of tenure and irremovability from office, the Court has considered that this, in turn, entails: (i) that the separation of judges from office must be exclusively as a result of the permitted causes, either by means of procedures that comply with judicial guarantees or because the mandate has concluded; (ii) that judges may only be dismissed on serious grounds of misconduct or incompetence, and (iii) that any procedure must be decided pursuant to the established rules on judicial conduct and in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and impartiality set out in the Constitution or the law.16 Moreover, the judgment In this regard, the consistent case law of the IACtHR in this regard has affirmed that the classification of an act as unlawful and the establishment of its legal effects must pre-exist the conduct of the subject who is considered the offender either in criminal matters or in administrative matters resulting in sanctions. To the contrary, the individual would be unable to tailor his conduct to a legal order in force and certain that expresses social reproach. and its consequences. See, in this regard: Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 106; Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, members and activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 29, 2014. Series C No. 279, para. 161 and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 288, para. 207. 15 16 Cf. Case of Cordero Bernal v. Peru. Preliminary objection and merits. Judgment of February 16, 2021. Series