an effective remedy, but also to ensure due application of that remedy by its judicial authorities.43 48. With specific reference to the effectiveness of the remedy, this Court has established that the meaning of the protection provided by the article is the real possibility of having a judicial remedy so that a competent and capable authority may issue a binding decision, determine whether or not there has been a violation of any right that the person who files the remedy considers he possesses and that, if a violation is declared, the remedy is useful to restore the enjoyment of the right to the interested party and to provide redress.44 This does not mean that the effectiveness of a remedy is evaluated based on whether it produces a favorable result for the defendant [italics and underlining added].45 49. On this basis, the majority opinion should have concluded that, even though a remedy existed under Peruvian law, this was not effective because it limited its admissibility to alleged violations of due process, rather than to the violation of fundamental rights possessed by those who form part of the judiciary, as judges, in a situation of dismissal or disciplinary proceedings. 50. This is even corroborated by the information provided by the State, which indicated that subsequent jurisprudential interpretation had established the effectiveness of the application for amparo to examine any violation of the fundamental rights resulting from the decision to dismiss a judge.46 In other words, it can be understood that, at least at the time of the facts, although the application for amparo, as it was defined, protected fundamental rights, in the case of judges, even if they cited other rights, these were not examined because this remedy was only admissible for violations of due process. 51. Nevertheless, the majority opinion merely noted the admissibility of the application for amparo in conformity with the only grounds for which it could be filed and did not examine it further in this case. And this was despite the fact that Mr. Cordero Bernal had argued “infringement of the guarantee of irremovability from office.” 52. In addition, it is worth noting that, pursuant to Article 2 of the American Convention (the violation of which was not argued in this case), the State was obliged to eliminate practices of any nature that entailed a violation of the guarantees established in the Pact of San José. Therefore, the State had failed to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the possibility of filing a simple, prompt and effective remedy before a competent judge or court against acts that violated fundamental rights other than due process which had occurred during a disciplinary proceeding. This failure should have resulted in a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in relation to the right to judicial protection. 53. Based on the above, I consider that although Mr. Cordero Bernal had access to the 43 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 237, and Case of López et al. v. Argentina, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019. Series C No. 396, para. 209. 44 Cf. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24; Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 6, 2008. Series C No. 184, para. 100, and Case of López et al. v. Argentina, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019. Series C No. 396, para. 210. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 67, and Case of López et al. v. Argentina, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019. Series C No. 396, para. 210. 45 46 Cf. Answering brief of the State (folio 290) and final written arguments of the State (folio 882).