11. Regarding the first point, it considered that “the grounds for removing judges from their posts must be clear and established by law” and “[t]aking into account that dismissal or removal from office is the most restrictive and severe disciplinary measure that can be adopted, the possibility of its application must be predictable: [(i)] because the punishable conduct is expressly and clearly established by law, precisely, rigorously and previously, or [(ii)] because the law delegates its imposition to the judge or to an infra-legal norm, under objective criteria that limit the scope of discretion.”5 Moreover, the IACtHR added “that some degree of imprecision does not result, per se, in a violation of the Convention; in other words, the fact that a law grants some discretionary power is not incompatible with the degree of predictability required.” However, the Inter-American Court conditioned this “imprecision of the law” indicating that “the scope of the discretion and the way in which it should be exercised [must be] indicated with sufficient clarity in order to provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference.”6 12. In that case, the Inter-American Court noted that, in principle, the law and its regulations that were applicable to the case established a system of sanctions (ranked according to the gravity of the offense) under which dismissal was applied both for serious offenses, but also for offenses classified as minor or less serious in case of non-compliance with or serious or reiterated violation of certain obligations. Thus, the IACtHR considered that the regulatory framework affected the predictability of the sanction because it permitted the dismissal of a judge based on non-compliance with any of the obligations or incompatibilities of his office when the court understood that it involved serious non-compliance; thus, it granted excessive discretionary power to the body responsible for applying the sanction.7 13. Accordingly, with regard to the sanctions imposed on the victims, the IACtHR did not assess whether or not the domestic norms were open in relation to the conducts that the norm should have defined; rather, on this point, international responsibility was circumscribed to the fact that “the disciplinary norms applicable to the cases of the […] victims granted excessive discretionary powers to the court in the establishment of the sanction of dismissal” [italics added]. 14. That said, regarding the second element – punishable conducts in disciplinary laws - the IACtHR considered that “[i]n the case of disciplinary sanctions imposed on judges, the requirement of including a statement of reasons is even greater than in other disciplinary proceedings, because the purpose of the disciplinary control is to assess the conduct, suitability, and performance of the judge as a public official and, consequently, the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction require analysis. In the disciplinary sphere, it is essential to indicate the offense precisely and to develop arguments that allow it to be concluded that the offending conducts are sufficiently serious to justify removing the judge from his post.”8 15. In particular, regarding the use of open or indeterminate disciplinary offenses, it indicated: “[…] in these assumptions […] it is fundamental to provide a statement of reasons […] because it is incumbent on the disciplinary court to interpret these norms respecting the Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 259. 5 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 264. 6 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, paras. 263 and 264. 7 Cf. Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 302, para. 267. 8