22 example, those resulting in the conviction of innocent people. Indeed, this led to the creation of an ad hoc Commission, which, by means of a pardon, achieved the liberation of these individuals. Thus, the essential structure of the legislation and, therefore, the reservations, were in force throughout Alberto Fujimori’s regime. In July 1999, the Government decided to declare itself in default before the inter-American system, by attempting to withdraw unilaterally the State’s acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court; a situation that was reversed with the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s regime. One of the first decisions adopted by the transition Government presided by Mr. Paniagua Corazao was the annulment of the State’s situation of default and the renewal of respect for and compliance with the obligations of the American Convention assumed by Peru. On January 3, 2003, the Constitutional Court of Peru (File No. 010-2002 AI/TC Marcelino Tineo et al. case) ruled on the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Decree Laws Nos. 25,475 and 25,659. That tribunal declared the unconstitutional nature of the crimes known as treason (Articles 1 and 2 of Decree Law No. 25,659 – crime of treason), recalling the arguments put forward by the Court in the Castillo Petruzzi et al. case. The central concern was the existence of duplication in the categories of the crime of treason, in relation to the pre-existing categories of the crime of terrorism. That tribunal also declared that the crime of justification of terrorism, established in Article 7 of Decree Law No. 25,475, was unconstitutional, since it created an excessive incrimination of this type of crime, because it was already established more precisely in Article 316 of the Penal Code, as justification of a crime. It also questioned the crime of justification of terrorism, because it was contrary to the principle of legality in its restricted sense, as well as respect for the right to freedom of expression. Furthermore, it established certain criteria for interpreting the said Article of the Penal Code, and stated that, in its opinion, they were extremely strict criteria that adequately delimited the crime of justification of terrorism. The Constitutional Court also delimited and defined the interpretation of the prohibited conduct in the basic crime of terrorism (Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475). The Court retained the constitutionality of this norm by delimiting its objective elements and open clauses, and establishing clarifications, which were incorporated into its text. According to the witness, the foregoing provided sufficient guarantees in light of the principle of legality. The Constitutional Court interpreted the threat and application of the penalty of life imprisonment in a restricted sense, by explaining that it would only be constitutional if provisions were introduced into domestic legislation to preclude it from being a penalty with no time limit, and providing for the possibility of eventual release from prison. Hence, it urged Congress to include a threshold above which it would be possible to review the sentence. As a result of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, a series of legislative decrees were issued to adapt anti-terrorist legislation to that tribunal’s decisions and, particularly, its interpretative criteria. Accordingly, Legislative Decree No. 924