68 d) The crime of collaboration established in Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475 “is not an autonomous crime,” it is an “accessory category” of the crime of terrorism established in Article 2 of this decree law; therefore, it is also defective, because it violates the principle of legality; e) Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475 “depends on Article 2 [of the same Decree Law] for the definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism and for a determination of whether the acts of collaboration were with elements or groups involved in terrorist activities.” Article 4 “does not contain any definition of terrorism or terrorist groups”; f) The classification of the crime of collaboration was introduced into Peruvian legislation in “1987 with Act 24,651”; g) This crime should be understood as a “type of complicity.” In its judgment of February 13, 2002, the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru, when referring to the judgment of June 20, 2001, described the defendant “as a secondary or subsidiary accomplice” without “shared functional control of the act”; and h) Peruvian legislation violates the principle of proportionality, by establishing the same minimum and maximum penalty for the crime of collaboration with terrorism as that applicable for terrorism. This excess penalization is retained in Legislative Decree No. 921. Arguments of the State 112. With regard to Article 9 of the Convention, the State argued that: a) Anti-terrorist legislation included four crimes: (i) “aggravated terrorism”; (ii) “terrorist attacks”; (iii) “terrorist association,” and (iv) “terrorist collaboration.” These crimes “are autonomous, even though they share common elements”; b) The problems of “ambiguity or lack of precision […] refer (i) to the absence of clear differences between crimes of aggravated terrorism and crimes of violence, and (ii) to the open structure of crimes of violence.” Crimes of terrorist association and terrorist collaboration “do not admit to this type of criticism”; c) “The crime of terrorist collaboration constitutes a distinct and autonomous type of crimes of violence”; it has a “specific” criminal classification and “its penalization is different from the penalization of the crime of terrorist violence”; d) The defects that the Inter-American Court has identified in the general legislation on terrorism, and in the provisions on jurisdictions, cannot necessarily be transferred to the crime of terrorist collaboration, “which, even though it is penalized in the same body of laws, has distinct characteristics that make it necessary to differentiate it”; e) “[T]he compatibility of the crime of terrorist collaboration with the rights embodied in the [American] Convention cannot be established without