67 e) Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475, which defines the crime of collaboration with terrorism, “in addition to reiterating the elements of Article 2 of that decree, with a systematic interpretation since they deal with the same legal structure, shares the serious defects that the Inter-American Court has indicated concerning the definition of the crime of terrorism, owing to its theoretical and ambiguous nature, and the failure to specify the conduct of the perpetrator in the definition”; f) Based on the principle of “the special nature of dealing with the issue of terrorism, Article [4 of Decree Law No. 25,475] excludes and disregards basic categories of general criminal law, such as that of complicity, described in Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Peruvian Penal Code, and this adversely and seriously affects the situation of those put on trial, as regards the level of responsibility and the penalty”; g) When deciding the appeal for annulment filed by the alleged victim’s defense lawyer against the judgment of June 20, 2001, the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru stated, concerning how Lori Berenson’s conduct adjusted to the crime of collaboration that she was charged with, which is established in Article 4 of Decree Law No. 25,475, that “the defendant should have been charged with being a secondary accomplice or accessory based on the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Penal Code”; h) The legal consideration of the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru “reflects the vagueness and ambiguity in the definition of collaboration with terrorism described in Article 4 of Decree Law 25,475.” “It is Peru’s maximum court of justice itself that adjusts [Lori] Berenson’s behavior to complicity, which is a mechanism expanding the category, and not to an autonomous conduct as [...] the State attempts to demonstrate”; and i) Since the principle of legality was not respected in the military and civil proceedings, this “impaired the right [of the alleged victim] to know what crime she was tried and sentenced for, and which jurisdiction should have heard her case.” Arguments of the representatives of the alleged victim 111. Regarding Article 9 of the Convention, the representatives of the alleged victim argued that: a) The purpose of the decree laws was to justify “the extreme State policies of arrest, detention, physical abuse, and prison sentences for individuals charged with acts of terrorism by the Peruvian National Police or by the Armed Forces”; b) Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25,475, which defines the crime of “terrorism” is “utterly vague and ambiguous”; c) Decree Laws Nos. 25,475 and 25,659 were “interrelated”; their provisions were “in keeping” with each other;