52 the issue of indigenous and tribal peoples’ land rights and that such remedies are only available to individuals, not peoples. 177. Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of States to afford effective judicial recourse against acts that violate fundamental rights. In interpreting the text of Article 25 of the Convention, the Court has previously held that the State’s obligation to provide judicial recourse is not simply met by the mere existence of courts or formal procedures, or even by the possibility of resorting to the courts. Rather, the State has the duty to adopt positive measures to guarantee that the remedies it provides through the justice system are “truly effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress.”191 Accordingly, the Court has declared that “[t]he inexistence of an effective recourse against the violation of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the Convention by the State Party in which such a situation occurs.”192 178. With regard to members of indigenous peoples, the Court has stated that “it is essential for the States to grant effective protection that takes into account their specificities, their economic and social characteristics, as well as their situation of special vulnerability, their customary law, values, and customs.”193 Specifically, the Court has held that, in order to guarantee members of indigenous peoples their right to communal property, States must establish “an effective means with due process guarantees […] for them to claim traditional lands.”194 H.1) Suriname’s Civil Code 179. The Court considers that the judicial recourse available under Article 1386 of the State’s Civil Code is inadequate and ineffective to remedy alleged violations of the Saramakas’ right to communal property for the following two reasons. First, such recourse is presumably available only for individuals claiming a violation of their individual rights to private property. The Saramaka people, as a collective entity whose legal personality is not recognized by the State, may not resort to such recourse as a community asserting its members’ rights to communal property (supra paras. 159-175). Second, the Saramakas’ legal right to communal property is not recognized by the State (supra paras. 97-116) and, therefore, judicial recourse that requires the demonstration of a violation of a legal right recognized by the State would not be an adequate recourse for their claims. 180. Evidence submitted before this Tribunal regarding cases filed by members of other indigenous or tribal peoples in Suriname pursuant to its Civil Code support the Saramakas’ contention that the recourse is ineffective to address their claims. In one such case, a domestic court denied a community’s request to revoke a mining concession, holding that the community lacked the legal capacity as a collective entity to request such measures, and referred the community back to the Minister who had issued the mining concession.195 In another case, a State-issued, privately held land title within a residential area of an 191 Cf. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24. 192 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 185; Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, para. 130, and Case of Yatama, supra note 13, para. 168. Cf. also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 191, para. 24. 193 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 75, para. 63. 194 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 75, para. 96. 195 Affidavit of Mariska Muskiet, supra note 187, (folio 1943).