7 protection of human rights.14 Moreover, a person or group of persons other than the alleged victims may file the petition.15 23. In light of these considerations, this Tribunal finds no conventional prerequisite that the paramount leader of a community must give his or her authorization in order for a group of persons to file a petition before the Inter-American Commission to seek protection for their rights, or for the rights of the members of the community to which they belong. As previously noted, the possibility of filing a petition has been broadly drafted in the Convention and understood by the Tribunal.16 24. Thus, for the purposes of this case, this Court is of the opinion that the Association of Saramaka Authorities, as well as the twelve Saramaka captains, can be considered as a “group of persons” in accordance with the wording of Article 44 of the Convention and the Court’s interpretation of said provision. Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that, in light of the American Convention, it was not necessary for the petitioners to obtain authorization from the Gaa´man in order to file a petition before the Inter-American Commission. For these reasons, the Court dismisses the first preliminary objection. B) SECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION Lack of legal standing of the representatives before the Inter-American Court 25. As a second preliminary objection, the State challenged the locus standi in judicio of the alleged victims and their representatives in the proceedings before this Court. The State asserts that, in accordance with Articles 51 and 61 of the Convention, only the State and the Commission may bring a case to the Court and appear before this Tribunal. According to the State, any independent or separate participation by the alleged victims and their representatives would be contrary to the Convention and the principle of equality of arms. As only a draft Protocol exists concerning the standing of individuals before the Court, and because the Court’s Rules of Procedure cannot supersede the Convention, the State concludes that individuals cannot yet have legal standing before the Court. Thus, participation of the alleged victims and their representatives can only take place through the Commission. Moreover, the State argued that the representatives do not have standing to separately and independently allege before the Court that Suriname violated the right recognized in Article 3 of the Convention. The Commission and the representatives asserted that, once the Commission submits a case to the Court, the alleged victims or their representatives have standing to submit to the Court requests and arguments autonomously, based on the facts set out in the Commission’s application. 26. Indeed, as stipulated by Article 61 of the Convention, the Inter-American Commission is the body empowered to initiate the proceedings before the Court by lodging an application. Nevertheless, the Tribunal is of the view that preventing the alleged victims from advancing their own legal arguments would be an undue restriction upon their right of access to justice, which derives from their condition as subjects of international human rights law.17 At the current stage of the evolution of the Inter-American system for the 14 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 77. 15 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 14, para. 77; Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al., supra note 13, para. 137, and Case of Yatama, supra note 13, para. 82. 16 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., supra note 14, para. 77; Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al., supra note 13, para. 137, and Case of Yatama, supra note 13, para. 82. 17 Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners”, supra note 8, para. 155; Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 54, and Case of