9 remedies have been exhausted is necessarily known, or should be known, and that is the day on which the alleged victim has been notified of the decision that exhausted those remedies, or that is not necessary to exhaust them, all of which must be indicated in the said petition. Regarding the spirit of the said provisions of the Convention, it should be reiterated that if it were not compulsory to have exhausted the domestic remedies before lodging the pertinent petition, it would be permissible that, at least for a certain time, that is, between the moment at which the corresponding petition or communication was lodged and the moment at which the Commission issued the decision on its admissibility (a lapse that in many situations may be considered overlong), the same case could be processed simultaneously by the domestic jurisdiction and by the international jurisdiction, which would evidently make the provisions of the second paragraph of the Preamble, and even the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, meaningless. In other words, the inter-American jurisdiction would not be subsidiary and complementary to the domestic jurisdiction, but rather would substitute it or, at the very least, could be used as an element to exert pressure on the latter. But, in addition, if it is accepted that compliance with the said requirement may take place at a time subsequent to the lodging of the pertinent petition or its completion, this could constitute an incentive to lodge petitions or communications before the Commission even when the said requirement has not been met, in the hope that it will be possible to comply with it prior to the Commission’s ruling on their admissibility, which, evidently, could not have been the intention of, or foreseen by, the States Parties to the Convention or, at least, there is no record in the relevant documentation that they considered this. Also, as regards the spirit that inspired the provisions in question, it should be noted that, if the principle that the said requirement must be met when lodging or completing the petition concerned is not followed and, to the contrary, the thesis is adopted that this time frame would be determined by the moment when the Commission rules on the admissibility of the corresponding petition, this could lead to overtly unfair and arbitrary situations. Indeed, since the time limit for the petitions or communications lodged before the Commission to comply with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies would then depend, not on the petitioner or applicant, but on the Commission’s decision on their admissibility or inadmissibility, it is clear that this time limit would not be the same in all cases and would not be known in advance as is essential. It is evident that this possibility could not have been the intention of the States Parties to the Convention, nor can the said provisions be interpreted in a sense that makes this feasible. All things considered, logically, for the petition to be admitted it is the petitioner who must prove that the petition or communication complies with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies or, otherwise, ask to be exempted from this obligation. And, obviously, this issue must be broached in the petition itself. In the instant case, this did not occur because, according to the Judgment itself, “[r]egarding the lodging of the initial petition before the Commission, … [the Court] has verified that, indeed, the alleged victim forwarded this document on August 22, 2003, and that, at that time, the final judgment in the criminal proceedings against him had not been delivered, as this was handed down on November 5, 2003.”26 reasonable period of time, as determined by the Commission. For this purpose, the Commission shall consider the date on which the alleged violation of rights occurred and the circumstances of each case.” 26 Para. 17.