7 petition” by filing an application with the Court. Consequently, basing itself on the provisions of Article 27(2) of its Rules, under which “[t]he preliminary objection shall set out the facts and the law on which the objection is based,” the Court will not deal with this objection. 37. The Court will now examine the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to which Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention refers. That article provides that: Article 46 1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law; [. . .] 38. This requirement allows the State to resolve the problem under its internal law before being confronted with an international proceeding. This is particularly true in the international jurisdiction of human rights, because the latter reinforces or complements the domestic jurisdiction (American Convention, Preamble). (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 64; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 85.) The Court has stated that: Generally recognized principles of international law indicate, first, that this is a rule that may be waived, either expressly or by implication, by the State having the right to invoke it, as this Court has already recognized (see Viviana Gallardo et al., Judgment of November 13, 1981, No. G 101/81. Series A, para. 26). Second, the objection asserting the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, to be timely, must be made at an early stage of the proceedings by the State entitled to make it, lest a waiver of the requirement be presumed. Third, the State claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective. (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 18, para. 88; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 18, para. 87; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 18, para. 90. See also In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., No. G 101/81. Series A.) [T]he rule of prior exhaustion is a prerequisite established in favor of the State, which may waive its right, even tacitly, and this occurs, inter alia, when it is not timely invoked. (Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, ibid., para. 109.) 39. The Court notes that the Government did not interpose the objection of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies before the Commission, a fact that was expressly confirmed by the Agent during the public hearing of December 2, 1991. This constitutes a tacit waiver of the objection. The Government also failed to indicate in a timely fashion the domestic remedies that, in its opinion, should have been exhausted or how they would be effective. 40. Consequently, the Court considers that the Government is untimely when it now seeks to invoke the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies that it should have interposed before the Commission but did not.