36. In its final written arguments, the State indicated that expert witness Claudia González Orellana, was never either “[im]partial or objective,” and that her opinion went beyond the purpose established by the President. It also argued that the expert opinion of Christine Mary Chinkin was characterized by an evident bias and lack of objectivity, did “not respond expressly to the questions,” and “was not grounded on specific or proven facts, but rather on suppositions, data and statistics that the expert witness herself had acknowledged were not reliable.” Consequently, Guatemala expressed its disagreement with the opinions of expert witnesses González and Chinkin being used as evidence in this case. The Court considers that these objections relate to the probative weight and scope of the said expert opinions, but did not affect their admissibility as part of the body of evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds it in order to admit them in the terms established in the said order of the President. 37. In addition, in a communication of April 6, 2015, the representatives presented an objection to the scope of the purpose of the statement of witness Víctor Manuel Boror de la Rosa, because, “after reviewing all the documents presented by the State [at the Court’s request – in other words, the file documents containing the procedural actions from May 2012 to date], [they had] only found four documents dated 2014.” Consequently, they asked the Court to “instruct the witness […], when referring to the investigative actions and procedures from 2014 to date in his statement, to adhere strictly to the facts contained in the [said four documents].” They also considered that admitting this testimony offered by the State, in the above-mentioned terms and without sharing with the parties the documentary grounds on which the testimony would mainly be based, would contravene the right to adversarial proceedings in relation to evidence, and the principle of the equality of arms. They also indicated that the State was trying to introduce new evidence after the time limits established in Articles 41 and 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court had expired. 38. In this regard, the order of the President of March 19, 2015 (supra para. 10) established that it would limit the statement by witness Boror de la Rosa if the State failed to forward the investigation file with the procedural actions conducted “to date” within a certain timeframe. In a brief of March 25, 2015 (supra para. 11), the State complied with this requirement by forwarding “three documents identified as Investigation Procedures,” which were part of the investigation file up until March 2014. The Court took note of the representatives’ observations on these investigation procedures forwarded by the State; however, their objection related to the probative weight and scope of the testimony of Mr. Boror de la Rosa, but did not affect its admissibility as part of the body of evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds it in order to admit the statement of the witness in the terms established in the President’s order. C. Assessment of the evidence 39. As established in Articles 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 57 and 58 of the Rules of Procedure, as well as in its consistent case law concerning evidence and its assessment, the Court will examine and evaluate the documentary probative elements forwarded by the parties and the Commission, the statements, testimony and expert opinions, and the helpful evidence requested and incorporated by the Court in order to establish the facts of the case and to rule on the merits. To this end, it will abide by the principles of sound judicial discretion, within the corresponding normative framework, taking into account the whole body of evidence and the arguments submitted in the case.22 Based on the Court’s case law, the statements of the presumed victims cannot be assessed in isolation, but rather in the context of all the evidence in the proceedings, insofar as they may provide further information on the presumed violations and the consequences. 23 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No 37, paras. 69 al 76, and Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 40. 23 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No 33, para. 43, and Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 41. 22 14