6 intellectual perpetrator (ordering) or as physical perpetrator, i.e. the actual wrongdoing (carrying out). These acts (quid of the omissions?) are oriented to a result expressly required by the crime definition: the “duly verified” disappearance of the victim. 26. Evidently, mere deprivation of freedom is not enough ―as required by the Convention, according to a wide protection scheme― but “disappearance” is also required, an ambiguous expression that is subject to various constructions. Furthermore, said “disappearance” must be “duly verified.” This requirement raises new difficult questions. Is the goal to have the applicant prove that disappearance, which is inadmissible, as alleged by some detractors of that principle? Is there a reference to the fact that occurrence of the crime can only be established and the perpetrator punished when disappearance has been “duly proven” – through judicial proceedings, where evidence is examined? Upon examining the wording used in Article 320 and its possible interpretations and consequences one should analyze if attempt, as a conduct, is not subject to criminal prosecution. Indeed, the definition of the crime requires the occurrence of an instance of disappearance and that said disappearance be duly proven. All in all, there is ample difference between that concept in domestic legislation and the description contained in the Inter-American Convention, as ratified by the State. 27. As regards the perpetrator, Article 320 refers to a specific characteristic: the person depriving the victim of his freedom is "a public official or servant.” In principle, the phrase “agents of the State” ―as used in the Convention― is wider than “public official or servant,” except as otherwise set forth in domestic rules aimed at explaining these concepts. Of course, incrimination will not apply ―at least under this legal category, whose enforcement is required by the international system― to individuals who are not public officials or servants, thus considerably restricting the description contained in Article II of the Convention. The judgment of the Court indicates that the domestic criminal standard restricts the category of wrongdoing and disregards other forms of criminal involvement. Considered as a whole, the problem is even greater: the crime definition excludes every from wrongdoing or criminal involvement in forced disappearance any individual not falling under the category of public official or servant. 28. Obviously, the domestic crime definition does not cover other elements of the legal definition of the crime set forth in the Convention, as mentioned above: i.e. absence of information or refusal to acknowledge that deprivation or to give information on the whereabouts of the victim. The consequence of that omission may be disadvantageous for the official and, therefore, result in the imposing of a more severe criminal punishment that the one established for the act of forced disappearance. Indeed, the crime would be perfected once the acts that result in said disappearance have been effectively performed, irrespective of the subsequent conduct of the official as regards information, explanations or acknowledgment. 29. During the regular session in which judgment was rendered in the Case of Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, the Court heard and decided –after the State acknowledged its liability- the Case of Blanco-Romero et al. v. Venezuela. In these proceedings, domestic legislation on forced disappearance of persons was also taken into account. In that regard, upon ordering reparations, the Court found that domestic legislation was not consistent with the Inter-American Convention on the matter and decided that the State should review legislation to guarantee compliance therewith.