2 profound differences. These concern both the characterization of the nature and use of the property (which affects its value for purposes of compensation) and the numbers drawn from the examination carried out by the various experts who participated. In this regard, paragraph 63referred judgment is particularly illustrative in regard to this vote. 11. Accordingly, the Court has not been provided with clear, sufficient, or accepted elements of analysis by the litigants. Moreover, the final determination concerns the responsibility and mission of the Tribunal, "the expert of experts," and is not overruled by the opinion of the experts or in the more or less automatic adoption of a sort of "average" between numbers that are distant one from another, with respect to the basis and its amount. 12. The Court, which has already expressed that it has the "power to verify whether (the) agreement (which eventually was reached by the State and the representatives of the victim) is consistent with the American Convention on Human Rights," was finally disagreed upon, requiring it to provide full reparation and to adopt a decision without the support that would have existed with the decision of the parties and the agreement (if it were relevant) of the opinion of experts. 13. As such, the need arose to resolve in equity, pursuant to that mentioned in paragraph 84 of the Judgment of March 3, 2011. However, the consequences of the implementation of equity to a problem that ideally should have been resolved in another manner, qualitatively and quantitatively - which could not be reached, as has already stated - divided the opinion of the judges and now explains the reason for separate considerations and opinions. 14. In my opinion, equity - justice in the case, is threatened by the nature of the case - in the case sub judice, there is a sharper consideration of the set of standards that explicitly or implicitly are enshrined in the Articles 21(1), 21(2), 32(2), and 63(1) of the Convention, as there is - always protecting fairness - the need to move between the wide space that exists between numbers that are very different and very distant from each other. It is necessary to find, in this wide space, a number that is reasonable for the scope of the objective sought by the Court at this time. 15. I must emphasize, to synthesize the reading of this particular opinion, to which I am not discussing, in any way, the terms of the judgment on the merits, or reviewing or rereading its terms. This judgment said what it needed to say about the formal legality of the expropriation, the formal legality of the process, the existence of a cause of action based on public or social interest, and other extremes of its incumbency. What I seek - to my knowledge and belief - is to infer from the Convention and the Judgment on the merits the basis for the identification of a reasonable amount as compensation. 16. The Court has decided, by a majority vote, what that number is. I shall not pose another, but I shall state that in my opinion the amount specified in the judgment of March 3 could have been more reasonable and thus provide a more equitable solution to the obvious problem that arises regarding the tension between the right to a person's private property and the social expectation of the community for whose benefit the expropriation was made. Both objectives are plausible. It is possible to head to them, especially when it entails operating with equity in the absence of conclusive evidence of another nature. 17. I think that the Court itself has considered some implications of the decision, which must be fulfilled by the Ecuadorian State, and perhaps more specifically - in practical terms - by the community of Quito, which now faces two overriding purposes: to carry out the ecological project that will benefit the health of the community and to provide the compensation that is due - with full justification, because it stems from the infringement of an individual right - that of the victim in this case. 18. I say that the Court has considered in some way - by implication - the circumstances in which it operates and the consequences that should be brought about by its judgment, in that it allowed the State to pay the compensation within five years, without accruing new interest charges due to this modality of payment. I do not believe that it would have been resolved in this way had the Court not considered the existing tension between the rights sought to be respected and the difficulty of making a single payment, or covering the payment in a shorter period or with interest accrued over time, of such a large amount (given the circumstances presented here), which perhaps would weigh very heavily on the