SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE OF CAESAR V. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (MARCH 11, 2005) 1. The judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to which I append this Separate Opinion, issued on March 11, 2005 in the Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, raises several issues related to important matters, such as the scope and effectiveness of the obligations undertaken by a State party to an international convention; the legality of certain forms of punishment in the light of domestic and international laws on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; some aspects of the due process of the law, particularly compliance with the “reasonable time” requirement; conditions of arrest for accused or convicted persons; and the proportionality between the offense committed and the punishment prescribed by law and enforced by the court. 2. All of these issues, with the exception of the latter, were covered by the Inter-American Court when considering the instant case and in the operative paragraphs of the respective judgment. Of course, the issue of whether the Court had competence to hear this matter has been also examined, notwithstanding the denunciation of the American Convention by the State, which did not enter an appearance in the proceeding, and the possible challenge to the competence of the Inter-American Court on the basis of the reservation — or limitation on the recognition of competence — to which the State subjected its ratification of the Convention when effecting it. I. COMPETENCE OF THE COURT 3. As regards the denunciation, it is important to consider that the facts sub judice occurred at a time when the State was a party to the American Convention. Therefore, they are subject to the Court’s competence ratione temporis. Even though the State did not appear in court, the Court prosecuted the case on its own motion. Current regulations confer this power on the Court, which is, at the same time, an obligation for the judicial organ. 4. With respect to the restriction in the recognition of the competence ratione materiae, it is meet to consider the view previously held by the Court in this regard in the Cases of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamín et al. (Trinidad and Tobago). Preliminary Objections. Judgments of September 1, 2001). On that occasion, the restriction established by the State at the time of ratifying the Convention was dismissed and the State accepted the contentious jurisdiction the Inter-American Court had. Such restriction was rejected because it was framed in such general terms as to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty and imply the conditioning of international jurisdiction by the organs of the domestic judiciary. If such a restriction were upheld, it would be impossible to determine the scope of international jurisdiction, the activity of which would be subject to assessment and admission by domestic authorities, on a case by case basis. 5. In my Separate Opinion accompanying the aforementioned judgment of September 1, 2001 I stated, and repeat today, that: “I agree with the judges of the Court when they indicate that the effect of the reservation or declaration with regard to the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, formulated by Trinidad and Tobago in the instrument ratifying the Convention (of April 3, 1991, and deposited on May 28, that year), would be to exclude the State from the