owing to their late presentation. Based on the foregoing, the Court considers that this evidence is inadmissible because it was presented after the deadline for its submission had passed. B. Admission of statements and expert evidence 27. Regarding the affidavits made by the presumed victims Messrs. Villarroel Merino, Cevallos Moreno, Coloma Gaibor, López Ortiz, Ascázubi Albán and Vinueza Pánchez, in its final arguments, the State argued that it could be observed that the statements exceeded the purpose delimited by the Court because, in several parts, they referred to facts and situations that were not relevant to the instant case and restated their claims for reparation. It also argued that, in their statements, the presumed victims merely described the police criminal proceedings against them, repeating the arguments made in the briefs presented during the processing of the case before the Inter-American Commission, which the latter had reflected in its Merits Report; consequently, the State questioned the evidentiary pertinence of the said statements. The Court notes that, indeed, in their statements, the presumed victims had referred to situations and claims for reparation that did not form part of the purpose of their statements. Therefore, the Court deems it pertinent to admit the said statements to the extent that these are in keeping with the purpose defined in the order requiring them (supra para. 7) and taking into account the corresponding observations of the State. 28. In addition, in the case of the expert opinion of Mario Luis Coriolano, in its final written arguments the State indicated that “this opinion seeks to support the hypothesis of the [Commission] and the presumed victims that they were deprived of their liberty unlawfully in the context of the police criminal proceedings instituted against them. However, this assertion is not true.” The Court notes that the State’s comment on this expert opinion refers to its evidentiary value and not to its admissibility. Consequently, the Court admits it and will take Ecuador’s comment into account when assessing the evidence. VI. FACTS 29. The Court will now describe the facts of the case in the following order: (A) Legal framework; (B) Presumed victims; (C) Detention and prosecution of the presumed victims, and (D) Claims for compensation. A. Legal framework 30. Articles 183 and 187 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter “the Constitution”) in force at the time of the facts established, respectively, that “[t]he public security forces shall be constituted by the Armed Forces and the National Police,” and that “[t]he members of the security forces shall be subject to a special jurisdiction for the prosecution of any offenses and October 25, 2007, and two undated; (3) Application for amparo filed by Jorge Villarroel Merino, Jorge Coloma Gaibor, Fernando López Ortiz and Patricio Vinueza Pánchez on July 2, 2003; (4) Excuse addressed to the Alternate President on July 2, 2003; (5) Two judicial decisions of the National Police Court of Justice dated July 3 and 9, 2003; (6) Appeal to reverse the judicial decision of July 3, 2003, filed by the defense counsel of Messrs. Villarroel, Coloma, López and Vinueza on July 7, 2003; (7) Dissenting votes of Fausto Aquiles Vasconez Naranjo and Alejandro Carrión Pérez of July, 9, 2003; (8) Administrative complaint for damages of Jorge Villarroel Merino addressed to the President of the Republic of Ecuador and filed on October 4, 2006; (9) Communication of the Secretary General for Legal Affairs of the Republic of October 12, 2006; (10) letter of Jorge Villarroel Merino addressed to the President of the Republic of Ecuador, presented on October 16, 2006; (11) letter of Jorge Villarroel Merino addressed to the Head of Human Resources of the National Council of the Judiciary, undated. 9