9 (...)Above all, this qualitative advance would fulfill, in my understanding, an imperative of justice. The jus standi - no longer only locus standi in judicio, - without restrictions, of individuals, before the Inter-American Court itself, represents - as I have indicated in my Opinions in other cases before the Court28 - the logical consequence of the conception and formulation of rights to be protected under the American Convention at the international level, to which the full juridical capacity of the individual petitioners to vindicate them ought to correspond necessarily.” (paras. 42-43) 29. More recently, in my Concurring Opinion in the aforementioned case of the “Five Pensioners” (2003), I argued that “Not always the complaint originally presented by the petitioners before the Commission (Article 44 of the Convention) is necessarily the same as the complaint subsequently interposed by the Commission before the Court (Article 61(1) of the Convention). If the States are required, in conformity with the Convention (Article 25), to respect the right of access to justice, preserving the faculty of the individual complainants to substantiate their legal actions before national tribunals, how can they be denied this same faculty in their arguments before an international tribunal like the Inter-American Court? (...) one cannot curtail the right of the petitioners of access to justice at the international level, expressed in their faculty to indicate the rights which they deem violated.” (paras. 20-21) The same applies to the arguments of the applicants on birth or emergence of international responsibility of the respondent State. IV. Implementation of the International Responsibility of the State through the Initiative of the Individual as a Subject of International Law. 30. This is precisely what happened in the instant case, in which the representative of the victims and their next of kin has submitted her own understanding of the origin of the responsibility of the State, different from that of the Inter-American Commission. Regarding this matter, we must take into account general international law, alongside and together with the American Convention. We must not forget that, of all the methods used in the international human rights protection systems, the only one that is activated by the individuals themselves (rather than activated ex officio by the bodies entrusted with their oversight) is the right to individual petition. It is by exercising this right that individuals, emancipated from their own State, are able to set in motion the process of implementing the international responsibility of the State. 31. To try to impede the jus standi of individuals before the international venue in the current sphere of protection is an unconvincing artifice, hostage to past dogma, incapable of understanding that assertion of the international juridical capacity and right to legal recognition of the human person reflects a real necessity of the international juridical order itself.29 As I noted in my Concurring Opinion in the aforementioned case of the “Five Pensioners”, if “before national tribunals the faculty of the individual complainants to substantiate their own allegations of violations of their rights is secured, how to justify the denial or restriction of that faculty to the 28 . See, in this regard, my Separate Opinions in the Castillo Páez versus Peru case (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 30.01.1996), paras. 14-17, and Loayza Tamayo versus Peru case (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 31.01.1996), paras. 14-17, respectively. 29 . A.A. Cançado Trindade, "A Personalidade e Capacidade Jurídicas do Indivíduo como Sujeito do Direito Internacional", in Jornadas de Derecho Internacional (Mexico City, December 2001), Washington D.C., OAS Subsecretariat of Legal Affairs, 2002, pp. 311-347.