13. The State alleges that in this ruling, the Supreme Court made it clear that the wiretapping and taping of the conversations were not ordered or carried out by the Public Ministry, or by the Attorney General. In this regard, the judgment of the Supreme Court of December 3, 1999 notes that “those who proceeded to tape the telephone conversation, for reasons unknown, were members of the Sayed family, and not of the Public Ministry, or specifically, the Attorney General of the Nation, as alleged by attorney Santander Tristán.”4 The State also alleges that the various items of evidence presented in this proceeding were properly weighed. b. With respect to the trial for slander and libel initiated by the Attorney General against Mr. Tristán Donoso because of the press conference called to report the taping and publication of his telephone conversation with his client 14. Second, with respect to the criminal complaint filed by the Attorney General against Mr. Tristán Donoso for the offenses of slander and libel, the State alleges that on June 27, 2000 a dismissal without prejudice was handed down on his behalf on the grounds that the offense against his honor was not shown in its objective aspect. This decision was appealed by the Office of the Fourth Circuit Prosecutor, and the Superior Tribunal of Justice for the First Judicial District decided to open the criminal case against Mr. Tristán Donoso as the alleged perpetrator of offenses against honor. That resolution relies on the falsity of the accusation made against the Attorney General, who taped his conversation, which makes it possible to prove the punishable act set forth in the criminal complaint. At present, according to the State, this process is pending a decision, and is to continue with the proceedings of the plenary phase. The Panamanian State calls on the IACHR to declare this part of the petition inadmissible, since domestic remedies have not been exhausted, and as the corresponding objections are pending. The State also considers that there are no objective causes to exempt the petitioner from having to meet this requirement. 15. It should be noted that in respect of the constitutional challenges filed by Tristán Donoso, the State alleges that on May 24, 2000 the Supreme Court decided not to admit the constitutional challenge as there was already a decision of October 28, 1998, in which it was established that the laws that were the basis of the accusation against Tristán Donoso are not unconstitutional. This decision was reported on June 5, 2000, and it was not challenged. IV. ANALYSIS OF ADMISSIBILITY A. The Commission’s competence ratione personae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, and ratione materiae 16. The Commission is competent to take cognizance of the instant case. First, the Commission is competent ratione materiae, because the petition alleges violations of human rights protected in Articles 1, 2, 8, 11, 13, and 25 of the Convention. Second, the Commission is competent ratione personae in view of its active and passive standing to examine the petition lodging a complaint against Panama, as the petitioners are authorized by Article 44 of the Convention to submit complaints to the IACHR, and the petition indicates as the alleged victim an individual. Third, the IACHR is competent ratione temporis, for as of the date on the which the acts are alleged to have taken place, the obligation to respect and ensure the rights protected in the Convention was already in force, as it was since on June 22, 1978 the date Panama deposited the instrument of ratification. Finally, the Commission is competent ratione loci insofar as the petition alleges violations, in Panama, of rights protected in the Convention. B. Other admissibility requirements of a petition a. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 17. Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention requires “that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.” The IACHR reiterates that this requirement has the purpose of allowing the State to resolve the issues raised within its own legal framework before having to be brought before an international body. In the following paragraphs, the IACHR will analyze whether this 4 See: Ruling of December 3, 1999 folio 17. 4