2 function of the Court, also suggests the characteristics that matters brought before it may have. 5. It would be impossible, in addition to undesirable, taking into account the ancillary or complementary nature of international jurisdiction, for it to receive a large number of contentious cases on identical or very similar facts, to reiterate, again and again, the criteria set forth in previous contentious cases. We must insist that the States themselves, guarantors of the inter-American human rights system, are at the same time essential components of this system, in which they participate through a political and juridical will that is the best guaranty of the true effectiveness of the international system for protection of human rights, based on the effectiveness of the domestic system for protection of those rights. 6. Therefore, in the logic of the system –and of the institutional aspirations of the Inter-American Court, as a component of the system- there lies the idea that the rulings of the Court must be reflected, in the manner and according to the terms set forth in domestic Law -as the bridge between the international and the national systems- in domestic legislation, in domestic jurisdictional criteria, in specific programs in this field, and in the daily actions of the State regarding human rights; they must, ultimately, be reflected in the national experience as a whole. This –a power to influence, rebuild, guide, inform- is what explains and justifies, ultimately, an international venue that does not have the possibility or the capacity to hear thousands of cases of identical litigation, reproducing both reasoning and rulings that have been set forth and reiterated previously. II. Patterns of violation 7. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled on facts that constitute, in a way, a traditional pattern of violation of rights. Recently, the Court has addressed different themes, on the border between the so-called first generation and second generation rights, or issues pertaining to the former that had not been brought up before and that enable opening new areas of jurisdictional reflection, which in turn propose new human rights frontiers in the Americas, in accordance with the interpretation given by the Inter-American Court. 8. Despite the gradual appearance of themes that are different from those covered during the eighties and even during the nineties, in the broad set of cases brought before the Court, some that are “traditional” in nature persist. Not only have they not declined or disappeared, as would have been desirable and seemed natural, but they have undertaken new expressions or have continued to be present, and this constant presence expresses the need, which I referred to above, to review the state of these issues under domestic venue to adjust it, without more ado, to international standards. The international court does its part as best possible when it identifies the major issues in the contentious cases that it hears or in the opinions that it issues and generates the jurisdictional doctrine contained in its considerations. The following stage must be carried out by the domestic venue, not only due to its legal competence but –especially- due to the real ability that it has to encompass all the problems that arise in the domestic sphere. 9. Those international standards do, in fact, coincide to a very large extent, or perhaps completely, from the standpoint of the legal provisions in force, with the purpose and the mandates reflected in the supreme national legal orders, and even in much of the secondary legislation. Therefore, it is necessary for the political and