83 177. Therefore, the Court finds that the State violated, to the detriment of Daniel Tibi, the right to be tried within a reasonable time, set forth in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. b) In regards to the right to presumption of innocence 178. Article 8(2) of the Convention sets forth that: [e]very person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. 179. Likewise, Principle thirty-six of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment establishes that: A detained person suspected of or charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent and shall be treated as such until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 162 […] 180. This Court has pointed out that the principle of presumption of innocence constitutes a basis for the right to fair trial. The provision set forth in Article 8(2) of the Convention gives rise to the obligation of the State not to restrict the liberty of the detainee beyond the limits of what is strictly necessary to ensure that he will not impede an efficient investigation or avoid law enforcement. In this regard, preventive imprisonment is a precautionary measure, not a punitive one. This concept is embodied in multiple international human rights instruments. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes that preventive imprisonment of the accused must not be the general rule (Article 9(3).) Deprivation of liberty, for a disproportionate time, of persons whose criminal liability has not been established would breach the Convention. It would be the equivalent of advanced punishment, which contravenes the universally recognized general principles of law.163 181. It has been proven that Mr. Tibi was detained from September 27, 1995 to January 21, 1998 (supra para. 90(11), 90(25) and 90(27)). This deprivation of liberty was unlawful and arbitrary (supra paras. 103 and 107). There was no evidence that would enable reasonably inferring that Mr. Tibi was involved in the “Camarón” Operation. Despite the fact that Article 108 of the Criminal Procedures Code forbade admitting the co-accused as witnesses, the State’s action was based on a single incriminating statement, which was subsequently denied (supra para. 90(8), 90(11) and 90(21)). This shows that there was an attempt to incriminate Mr. Tibi without sufficient indicia to do so, presuming that he was guilty and violating the principle of presumption of innocence. 182. Taken as a whole, the data regarding the criminal proceeding against the accused not only do not show that he was treated as one who is presumed innocent, but rather they show that at all times actions regarding the accused were as if he 162 United Nations, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 126, Principle 36. 163 See Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 145, para. 77.