82 171. Article 249 of said Code established that: [p]rovisional dismissal of the proceeding suspends substantiation of the proceeding for five years; and provisional dismissal of the charges against the accused suspends it for three years. These terms will begin on the date when the respective order of dismissal is issued. New evidence regarding the crime may be submitted during these periods, regarding liability or innocence of the accused. 172. Article 252 of said Code established that: [i]f the periods established in Article 249 have expired and the proceeding has not been reopened, the Judge will issue an order quashing the indictment in regards to the proceeding and to the accused, in response to a request by a party or ex officio, in accordance with the provisions of Article 245 of this Code. 173. The Inter-American Court notes that on September 3 or 5, 1997 the Second Criminal Judge of the Guayas, Alternate to the Eighteenth Criminal Judge of the Guayas, pursuant to Article 242 of the Criminal Procedures Code, issued an “order of provisional dismissal of the proceeding and of the charges against the accused” in favor of Daniel Tibi, who was released on January 21, 1998. 174. The Court is not aware of an order to definitively quash the indictment regarding the proceeding and the accused, in accordance with Article 252 of the Criminal Procedures Code. In this regard, on July 27, 2004 this Court asked the parties, as evidence to facilitate adjudication of the case, to provide copies of new rulings issued in the criminal proceeding against Daniel Tibi since January 14, 1998, if there were any. It did not receive the information requested. 175. To assess reasonability of this proceeding in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Convention, the Court takes three aspects into account: a) complexity of the matter, b) procedural activity of the interested party, and c) behavior of the judicial authorities.161 176. In this regard, the Court deems that the argument of the State that the judicial authorities had “acted in an agile manner despite the complexity and the characteristics of the matter under investigation and the possibilities of the State,” is insufficient to justify the delay in the proceeding against Daniel Tibi. The fact that almost nine years have passed since Daniel Tibi was detained conflicts with the principle of reasonability of the time to reach a decision in a proceeding, especially bearing in mind that, according to Ecuadorian law, when a provisional dismissal is ordered the case remains open for five years, during which time the investigation may be reopened if new evidence is submitted. The records do not show that Mr. Tibi behaved in a manner incompatible with his situation as a suspect or obstructed the proceeding. 161 See Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 3, paras. 129 al 132; Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al.. June 21, 2002 Judgment. Series C No. 94, para. 143; and Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 145, para. 72.