66 4) Permissible restrictions on freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society 120. Freedom of expression is not an absolute right; instead, it may be subject to restrictions, as Article 13 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Convention provide. Article 13(2) of the American Convention provides for the possibility of establishing restrictions on freedom of expression where it states that abusive exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability. However, beyond what is strictly necessary, such restrictions are not to limit the full scope of freedom of expression or become direct or indirect methods of prior censorship. In order to determine subsequent liabilities, three requirements must be met: 1) the restrictions must be previously established by law; 2) they must be intended to ensure the rights or reputation of others or to protect national security, public order, or public health or morals; and 3) they must be necessary in a democratic society. 121. The Court has written the following with regard to these requirements: the "necessity" and, hence, the legality of restrictions imposed under Article 13(2) on freedom of expression, depend upon a showing that the restrictions are required by a compelling governmental interest. Hence if there are various options to achieve this objective, that which least restricts the right protected must be selected. Given this standard, it is not enough to demonstrate, for example, that a law performs a useful or desirable purpose; to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by reference to governmental objectives which, because of their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right Article 13 guarantees. Implicit in this standard, furthermore, is the notion that the restriction, even if justified by compelling governmental interests, must be so framed as not to limit the right protected by Article 13 more than is necessary. That is, the restriction must be proportionate and closely tailored to the accomplishment of the legitimate governmental objective necessitating it. 100 122. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the European Convention, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that "necessary," while not synonymous with "indispensable," implies "the existence of a 'pressing social need'" and that for a restriction to be "necessary" it is not enough to show that it is "useful," "reasonable" or "desirable." 101 The Court espoused this concept of “pressing social need” in its Advisory Opinion OC-5/85. 123. Hence, the restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate interest that justifies it and must be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve that objective. It should interfere as little as possible with effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 124. Now that the Court has determined the content of the right to freedom of thought and expression, has highlighted the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society and the role that the media and journalism play therein, and has established the requisites that must be met for restrictions on freedom of 100 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 85, para. 46; see also Eur. Court H. R., Case of The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra note 91, para. 59; and Eur. Court H. R., Case of Barthold v. Germany, supra note 91, para. 59. 101 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, supra note 85, para. 46; Eur. Court H. R., Case of The Sunday Times, supra note 91, para. 59.