A.
The petitioners
6. The petitioner reports that Mrs. María Cristina Reverón joined the Venezuelan judiciary in
1982, serving in various positions (judge, prosecutor, public defender). On July 16, 1999, she
was appointed as a Judge of First Instance in Criminal Matters for the Criminal Judicial Circuit
of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas. The decree appointing her established her status as a
provisional judge “until the competitive examination established in Article 21 and following of
the Judicial Career Law actually took place. 2 For this reason, the petitioner maintains that the
judge had the right to remain in the position until the competitive examination was held, even
more so given that she entered the judiciary before the 1999 Constitution took effect.
7. The petitioner asserts that the alleged victim, as part of the functions pertaining to her
office, heard a case with significant political repercussions in the country, in that the accused
(Pablo López Ulacio) was the director of an important media outlet in Venezuela (the
newspaper “La Razón”). After that person had refused –on seven occasions – to appear to
make a statement, the judge ordered that he be arrested to submit a signed statement before
the court. It is alleged that the family of the accused submitted a disciplinary complaint before
the Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System 3 and –according
to the petitioners – due to undue pressures on that Commission, the judge’s order was ruled to
be inexcusable judicial error 4 and the decision was made on February 6, 2002 to remove her
from her position. 5
8. In response to this situation, an appeal that the earlier decision be vacated was filed before
the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on March 10, 2002. That
action alleged that the removal measure represented clear interference by an administrative
body in judicial autonomy and independence and that her decision had been based on the law
and current jurisprudence. Specifically, the judge maintained that removal was carried out due
to the “way in which a legal provision was interpreted, namely Article 271 of the Criminal
Procedural Organic Code in effect at the time. 6 The petitioner alleged that this constituted a
violation of the principle of the independence of judges, in that judges may not be subject to
the disciplinary regime except in the case of “inexcusable judicial error.” It was then alleged
that what had happened was a “substantive error” that had been corrected by the court and
that the accused “never suffered any consequences from that error because he was never
arrested by the competent authorities” and “if that conduct were considered an error, the
penalty would be a reprimand.” It was also noted that the action being challenged had the
defect of being unjustified, in that it omitted any consideration of the arguments put forth in
the explanatory brief.
2
Judicial Career Law, Special Official Gazette No. 5.262 of September 11, 1998. Article 21. The Board shall organize
and direct the Competitive Examinations referred to in this law in accordance with the regulations it shall issue for the
purpose.
3
This body has jurisdiction to conduct disciplinary investigations of judges as of December 29, 1999, the publication
date of the Decree establishing the Public Power Transition Regime, passed by the National Constituent Assembly. This
decree establishes: Article 23. The judicial disciplinary jurisdiction of the disciplinary courts, pursuant to Article 267 of
the Constitution, shall be exercised by the Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System, in
accordance with this transition regime and until the National Assembly passes legislation defining disciplinary
procedures and tribunals.
4
Article 40(4) of the Judicial Career Law provides as follows: Article 40. Without prejudice to applicable criminal and
civil liabilities, judges shall be removed from their positions, after due process, on the following grounds: (…) 4. When
they have committed an inexcusable serious judicial error as recognized in a ruling from the Court of Appeals or the
Higher Court or the respective Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as applicable, and removal has been
requested.
5
Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System, Resolution No. 0033-2002 of February 6,
2002.
6
Article 271. Failure to comply. The accused may be the subject of a judicial order of preventive detention when he is
outside the area where he must remain according to Article 269, or when although remaining in the same place he
fails without justification to appear before the judicial authority or the Public Ministry that summons him. If he cannot
be apprehended, revocation of the substitute order may lead to enforcement of the bail bond.
2