provided of course that she meets the requirements in each case, the court orders an evaluation of the entire period of her time in the judiciary as well as her inclusion, should she so wish, in the indicated competitive examinations.” Finally, the order indicated that “in that this decision does not order that the judge be reinstated to the position she held, this Chamber refrains from ordering the payment of salary not received as from the date of removal.” 12. The petitioner maintains that the result of this decision is that provisional judges in Venezuela can be freely removed from their positions and not even a declaration of the absolute nullification of the action removing them gives them the right to reinstatement to the position they held. This means denying judges any sort of stability, as they would remain in their positions under the threat of being removed for any reason. The petitioner states that this constitutes discriminatory treatment compared to tenured judges. In addition, the petitioner asserts that the same Political-Administrative Chamber has ordered the reinstatement to their position of illegally removed judges, which would indicate another discriminatory situation. 9 13. The petitioner alleges that to date no competitive examinations have been held for this or any other judicial position, and thus the position is in the hands of another judge with the same provisional status. The petitioner asserts that Mrs. Reverón had been appointed a criminal judge after participating in and winning a competitive examination, unlike the case of the provisional judges who currently hold judicial positions in Venezuela, who are appointed freely at the discretion of the Judicial Commission of the Executive Directorate of the Magistracy. The petitioner then indicates that “thus in the worst case she should have been reinstated to another court at a similar rank.” 14. The petitioner also indicates that in the instant case there is a denial of justice because the decision of the Supreme Court does not satisfy Mrs. Reverón’s principal claim, her reinstatement and payment of salary not received, even though the illegality of her removal has been recognized. The petitioner insists that this is even more serious because the judge had stability “until the respective competitive examination was held” according to the decree in which she was appointed. 15. Furthermore, the petitioner believes that all of the above implies a failure to recognize the right to take part in the judiciary under conditions of equality, based on Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention. The petitioner notes that “all persons who satisfy the prerequisites established by the Constitution and the law for serving as judges have the right, once chosen and elected under conditions of equality, to remain in their positions, without that right’s being limited by banal excuses such as the ‘restructuring’ of the judicial branch.” 16. With respect to the State’s argument according to which Mrs. Reverón had to indicate her desire to participate in the respective competitive examination at the time she filed her challenge, the petitioner indicates that there is no legal provision that requires such a statement of desire. Nonetheless, the petition notes that Mrs. Reverón did indicate her desire to participate in eventual competitive examinations, so much so that the suspension of the effects of the act of removal was sought when the appeal for revocation was filed. This request was denied by the Political-Administrative Chamber. 10 The request would have been made for the eventual holding of the referenced competitive examination, an event that ultimately did 9 Offered in support here is the decision of the Political-Administrative Chamber of August 10, 2000, in the Gloria Pinho de Ramírez case. According to the petitioner, this ruling recognized the stability of provisional judges and orders the reinstatement of a provisional judge who had been removed illegally. In that decision, the Court stipulated that “this Chamber must order the Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System to take the measures it deems advisable to immediately reinstate citizen Gloria Pinho de Ramírez to the position she held in the judicial branch, i.e., as Judge in the Seventh Court for the Transitory Procedural Regime and not to the Court erroneously indicated by the Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System in the sanction through which it proceeded to remove the petitioner (…) Consequently, the aforementioned judge … is incorporated in the judicial branch as of this decision, under the same conditions in which she found herself before the removal decision issued by the Commission on the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System, with the duties and rights inherent to the position of Judge and, in particular, her proper participation in the processes of evaluation and competition to be carried out in the Judicial Branch.” 10 This request for suspension was denied by the Political-Administrative Chamber in the interlocutory order dated May 13, 2003. Judge Rapporteur: Yolanda Jaimes Guerrero. 4