condition for the free development of the individual,79 and includes the following: (a) the right of all persons lawfully within a State to move freely about in it and to choose their place of residence, and (b) their right to enter, to remain in, and to leave the territory of the State without unlawful interference. Thus, the enjoyment of this right does not depend on any specific purpose or reason for the person who wishes to move or to remain in a particular place.80 In addition, the Court has considered that the right to freedom of movement and residence can be violated by de facto restrictions if the State has not established the conditions or provided the appropriate means to exercise it.81 In this regard, the right to freedom of movement and residence may be affected when an individual is the victim of threats or harassment and the State does not provide the necessary guarantees to allow him to move about in and reside freely in the territory in question, even when the authors of the threats and harassment are non-State agents.82 94. In this case, although there is no evidence that the State formally restricted the freedom of movement and residence of the members of Lysias Fleury’s immediate family, the facts that have been established lead the Court unequivocally to the conclusion that the said freedom of movement and residence has been limited by a serious de facto restriction originating from the threats and harassment that led to their departure from the country, as well as the justified fear arising from everything that happened to Mr. Fleury, added to the failure to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the facts, which has kept them away from their community.83 This situation can also be included in the interpretation that the Court has made of Article 22(1) of the Convention.84 95. In the circumstances of the instant case, and given the situation of impunity, the State failed to comply with its obligation to provide Mr. Fleury with the necessary conditions of security for him to live peacefully at home with his family after he had been tortured by 79 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 115 and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213 para. 197. 80 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 79, para. 115, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, supra note 79, para. 197. See also, United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, of 2 November 1999, paras. 1, 4, 8 and 19. 81 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 110, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, supra note 79, para. 197. 82 Cf. Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, supra note 66, para. 139, and Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, supra note 79, para. 197. 83 Cf. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 81, para. 120 and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010. Series C No. 212, para. 150. Cf. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 17, para. 188, and Case of Chitay Nech v. Guatemala, supra note 83, para. 141. See also Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 of 11 February 1998, p. 5. Annex. Introduction: scope and purpose. No 2. These principles have been recognized by the international community. See also United Nations, General Assembly, Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, A/RES/64/162, of 17 March 2010, p.1.; Cf. Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on internally displaced persons, 5 April, 2006; African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), 23 October 2009, article 1(K), and Human Rights Council, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin. A/HRC/13/21/Add.3, p. 4. II.4. In this regard, the OAS General Assembly has recommended that the States use the Guiding Principles as a basis for developing their policies and even that they consider incorporating them into their national laws in order to promote their implementation. Cf. AG/RES. 2508 (XXXIX-O/09) “Internally displaced persons,” approved in the fourth plenary session held on June 4, 2009, second operative paragraph. 84 26