following year. In addition, nothing in the case file suggests a particular context to the facts that would require complicated determinations beyond the existence or not of a causal relationship between Mr. Spoltore’s health and his work at the company. Thus, no complexity in the process is indicated either by the time that passed between the facts and the suit’s filing or by the context in which those facts took place. 56. Third, regarding the various remedies filed by the parties, the Commission holds that the lodging of legally permissible remedies in a judicial proceeding cannot constitute grounds for arguing the complexity of that proceeding. When legally permissible remedies are filed, it falls to the judicial authorities to process and resolve them in accordance with the provisions of law. The Inter-American Court has ruled that although in certain circumstances constant appeals filed by the parties could give rise to a degree of confusion in the processing of a case, it nevertheless falls to the judge, as the director of the proceedings, to ensure that they are correctly processed.55 57. Fourth, regarding the participants in the process, the Commission notes that the labor proceedings involved a single plaintiff arguing the right of a single individual to compensation. In contrast, one of the State’s main arguments regarding complexity relates to the involvement of three insurance companies in addition to Mr. Spoltore and the respondent company. On this point, the Commission holds that although in previous cases the Inter-American Court has determined the existence of numerous participants at trial to be a contributing element to complexity, those rulings were given in connection with criminal proceedings and with respect to a much higher number of participants. In the case at hand, the additional players were three insurance companies, which the State has not shown to have been responsible for the delay. On the contrary, the State merely spoke of the complexity in general terms on account of the numbers of participants in the proceedings, without explaining the causal relationship between those companies’ actions and the different delays that arose during the proceedings and that will be analyzed below. 58. In light of the foregoing, the Commission believes that the State failed to prove that the labor proceedings initiated by Mr. Spoltore were of such complexity as to justify a duration of more than 12 years. 2.2 Actions of the authorities 59. As regards the second element—the actions of the judicial authorities—the Commission first notes that the suit was filed on June 30, 1988, and that the respondent company replied to the suit two months later and requested the involvement of two insurance companies as third-party respondents. It took the Labor Tribunal one year and three months to process the summons served on the insurance companies, with which the evidentiary phase did not begin until one year and five months after the suit was lodged. 60. Two experts were appointed on December 1, 1989, and their expert opinions were not presented until April and May 1990—in other words, four and five months after they were requested. The State did not explain the delay in producing those expert opinions, which were not particularly complex. The information available indicates that the next evidentiary formality—which was also related to expert opinions—took place approximately one year later, in May 1991, when additional expert reports were added to the case file. Likewise, in connection with the medical expert opinion received in July 1991 that was subsequently challenged, a new expert report was received in September 1992: that is, more than a year later. Eight months later, in May 1993, a new expert opinion was ordered; it was delivered in June 1993 and, in July of that year, orders were given for the deeds of notification to be served on the parties. That simple notification procedure was not carried out until eight months later, in March 1994. Following those formalities, the hearings in the case began in May 1995. In other words, the evidentiary phase—which essentially involved expert opinions—lasted for five years and five months, a delay that, from the available information, cannot be explained by the nature of those expert opinions or by the actions of the participants in the proceedings. 61. A total of six hearings in the case were held over an additional period of two years and one month, until judgment was issued on June 3, 1997. The State has not explained why six hearings were needed 55 I/A Court H. R. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 176. 10