claim on the grounds that it found no causal link between his work and the state of his health. It noted that Mr. Spoltore filed appeals against the ruling, which were dismissed on August 16, 2000. 17. The State added that on September 16, 1997, Mr. Spoltore filed a disciplinary complaint against the Labor Tribunal, in which it was found that actions attributable to the Tribunal had caused unjustified delays in two specific formalities and, on account of which, the decision to “reprimand” the clerk of the Tribunal was taken. 18. The State claimed that those findings did not mean that there was an unwarranted delay in the judicial proceedings as a whole. It added that the admission could not be extended to all the other formalities in the proceedings and that the time taken by other stages must be seen in light of the particular circumstances of the case. 19. The State noted that in addition to the respondent company, the proceedings involved three insurance companies as third-party respondents, which meant that all the proceedings had to be placed before all the co-defendants and that each one of them had to be afforded the possibility of lodging the remedies and objections allowed to them by law. The State indicated that it could not be blamed for the delays in summoning the insurances companies since those delays were due to the actions of the respondent company in failing to provide all the information on the insurance policies it held. It added that one of the third-party insurance companies appeared while undergoing corporate reorganization while the main respondent had declared an arrangement with its creditors and had even changed its corporate name. The State claimed that several formalities were challenged, repeated, or delegated to experts’ offices in another jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, it maintained that the time taken to process the case was neither excessive nor unreasonable. 20. The State indicated that many of the evidentiary formalities carried out during the proceedings were proposed by Mr. Spoltore. It added that the delays that occurred in the proceedings were due to the complexity of the case, to the issue at hand, to the large number of parties involved in the case, to the normal and regular exercise of the powers of each of the parties, and to the attention paid by the Tribunal to all of their contentions. Moreover, the State contended that the petitioner had failed to press his case. It stated that in Argentina, proceedings before labor tribunals, like all other cases before the civil courts, are governed by the principle of the impetus of the parties. 21. The State explained that this does not relieve it of the duty of guaranteeing that all judicial proceedings are dealt with within a reasonable time, but that this does not mean that particular attention need not be paid to the procedural activity of the interested party. It claimed that Mr. Spoltore could have lodged countless motions seeking the resolution of the delays in the disciplinary proceedings, which he failed to do. The State added that on November 11, 1992, the medical expert indicated the need for Mr. Spoltore to undergo a psychological examination and that, once again, there was no further activity in the case until March 23, 1993. 22. The State claimed that six hearings were scheduled. The first hearing, it claimed, was set for May 10, 1995, and the case file does not explain the reason why it was deferred. The second hearing, the State contended, was deferred by Mr. Spoltore, because an evidentiary formality was still pending. It noted that the third hearing was deferred because the respondent had informed the Tribunal of the initiation of the arrangement with its creditors and had requested deferral. The State reported that the fourth hearing was deferred because the commercial court involved in processing the creditors’ arrangement had failed to respond to a notice that it was sent. It stated that the fifth was deferred, without specifying the reasons. Finally, it reported that on June 3, 1997, the hearing in the proceedings took place. The State noted that between the first hearing and the last, a total of 2 years and 23 days passed. However, the case record does not indicate any challenges made by the petitioner to the dates set for the hearings or to the deferrals. IV. PROVEN FACTS 3