7 criminal proceedings: a) due process guarantees in the criminal case; b) definition of the crime as charged in the criminal proceedings; and c) no time bar on the criminal actions germane to the events consisting of the forced disappearance of Trujillo-Oroza. The Court deems it convenient to refer to these three aspects in itemized fashion. a) Due process guarantees in the criminal case 22. That, with regard to due process guarantees in the criminal case, in the private hearing (supra Having Seen clause No. 11,) the State referred to “the laws [according to which] non-criminal judges may be authorized to hear the case.” The State explained that under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, which is applicable to the pending proceedings, excuses and challenges are processed and decided in the light of civil procedure rules and the judicial administration act. Thus, chapter IV of Law 1760 [civil procedure abridgment and family assistance] on excuses and challenges provides a list of grounds for excuse of judicial officers. In the light of the provisions of section 3 of this law, 34 judges and 2 prosecutors of the Santa Cruz district excused themselves from hearing the case, including criminal, civil and domestic relations judges. The State pointed out that “[…] the excusing judge must remand the case to the new acting judge, who shall forthwith hear the case and continue with the proceedings. If the excuse is deemed illegal for not being properly grounded, the judge shall submit the background of the proceedings in consultation to the Superior Court.” The State affirmed that even if the excuse is declared illegal, the judge shall be definitely barred from hearing the case and this is the reason why the proceedings were remanded to all criminal judges, then to civil judges and, finally, to domestic relations courts. 23. That the State also noted that “[t]here are eleven grounds for excuse applicable to judicial officers[, and that] most of the excusing judges alleged that they had expressed an opinion on the legality or illegality of the prosecution before hearing the case.” The State acknowledged during the private hearing (supra Having Seen clause No. 11) that “excuses have been used in an excessive and arbitrary manner,” and that, as a result, “disciplinary proceedings have been instituted against the judges [and] fines amounting to 100 Bolivianos have been imposed; […] three judges have been suspended from office for one month.” The State also acknowledged that there were no express provisions forbidding the judges to express themselves publicly on matters submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts. 24. In light of the foregoing, the State affirmed that while there was a “legal framework authorizing a civil or commercial judge to hear a criminal case, as a result of the excuses made by the judges, […] the guarantees provided for in Article 8(1) of the American Convention regarding competence, independence and impartiality [of the judges] ha[d] not been infringed.” Nonetheless, during the private hearing (supra Having Seen clause No. 11) the State also highlighted that under the current criminal procedure system, the chapter on excuses and challenges of Law 1970 was amended. According to it, “in all new proceedings[,] if an excuse is declared illegal [the case] is remanded to the judge […,]” thus, in future proceedings there will be no need “to remand the case file to a non-criminal judge.” 25. That the representatives pointed out that “more than 40 judges have excused themselves [and the cases were remanded] to a domestic relations court.” Moreover, they noted that only “11 judges were fined with 100 Bolivianos, equal to USD $15 […]” They affirmed that this number of excuses is exceptional even in a process in Bolivia and that, in their opinion, “the real reason is political,” due to the alleged “association of most of the appointed judges […]”