in the present case of La Cantuta, and return to its much more lucid previous jurisprudence. The criterion of paragraph 128 of the Judgment of 11.29.2006 is a setback in the Court’s jurisprudence, and, as such, it must be, in my opinion, promptly abandoned; the demand included in the same for evidence of an “actual damage”, is too restrictive and the vague expression used in its, “several of those cases”, cannot cover the cases of preliminary execution and forceful disappearance of people. In these cases, the non-pecuniary damage, the suffering of the sisters and brothers of the fatal victims, must be presumed as true without requiring any evidence – except if the State accused is able to prove the contrary. 51. The Court itself, in its previous Judgment on merits and reparations, of 11.29.2006, pointed out the gravity of the facts, and, with regard to the fatal victims Juan Gabriel Mariños Figueroa and Heráclides Pablo Meza (along with others), it weighed in that, “while” their whereabouts “cannot be determined or their remains cannot be duly located and identified”, the “adequate legal treatment” for their situation is that corresponding to the “forced disappearance of people" (para. 114). And, in relation to the circumstances of the case, it added that, “the State’s international responsibility is in this case even more serious due to the context in which the facts were perpetrated." (para. 116) Thus, it is unjustifiable that the Court has demanded that the sisters and brothers of the fatal victims present evidence of the non-pecuniary damage caused due to their suffering. 52. In our Latin American countries, the feelings characteristic of strong family ties survive effectively within the social environment, maybe less so in the societies of countries more technologically “advanced”. Throughout the course of the legal proceedings of several cases solved by the Inter-American Court, I have been able to verify – in public hearings – demonstrations of the intense suffering of the siblings of victims of grave violations to human rights. This is something that, as a surviving Judge of the Court, I find myself in the obligation to recommend; the Court should not now, suddenly, establish, out of the blue, a new more restrictive criterion for the next of kin of the victims, - also victims in their own right, - ignoring all the previous experience recollected by the Tribunal. 53. In my understanding, the Court must always have present its own experience accumulated in the search for justice under the American Convention. The Court must not try to hastily innovate, without greater reflection (due to its new desire for productivity of judgments), and through setback, sometimes seeming to forget that the entire corpus juris of International Human Rights Law is oriented toward the victims, that it is clearly pro victima. The Court must not try to stop the emancipative line of its previous jurisprudence, oriented without a doubt toward the expansion – and not the restriction – of the condition of victim under the American Convention. 54. I will never forget, as a surviving Judge of the Inter-American Court, the devastating effect within a family, revealed in consecutive public hearings before this Court by the next of in themselves of the people executed or disappeared, in the cases of, for example Castillo Páez v. Peru (1997-1998), Blake v. Guatemala (19981999), Street Children (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, 1999-2001), Bulacio v. Argentina (2003), among others. Likewise, I will not forget, as a surviving Judge of this Court, the numerous expert opinions of psychologists – which were always greatly valued by me – received from them in public hearings, confirming the profound feeling of pain of the next of kin when facing the torture of a son or daughter, a brother or sister, - without the need for any evidence in this regard. This is currently confirmed by the specialized contemporary bibliography in what refers to the serious traumas suffered by the closest next of kin of fatal victims51 (also victims), and even . Cf., v.g., inter alia, B. Engdahl, M. Kastrup, J. Jaranson y Y. Danieli, "The Impact of Traumatic Human Rights Violations on Victims and the Mental Health Profession's Response", in 51