3 police found 111 cartridges and 33 bullets of the same caliber at the scene of the crime; they corresponded to sub-machine guns; d) The judicial investigations and newspaper reports revealed that those involved worked for military intelligence; they were members of the Peruvian Army who were acting on behalf of the “death squadron” known as the “Colina Group”, who carried out their own anti-terrorist program. Information from different sources indicates that, in the instant case, the acts were executed in reprisal against alleged members of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path); e) A week after the attack, Congressman Javier Diez Canseco gave the press a copy of a document entitled “Plan Ambulante” (Door-to-door [salesmen] Plan), which described an intelligence operation implemented at the scene of the crime. According to this document, the “terrorists” had been meeting in the place where the events of the instant case took place since January 1989 and they concealed themselves by pretending that they were door-to-door salesmen. In June 1989, Sendero Luminoso had carried out an attack about 250 meters from the place where the Barrios Altos events occurred, in which several of the assailants were disguised as door-to-door salesmen. f) On November 14, 1991, the senators of the Republic, Raúl Ferrero Costa, Javier Diez Canseco Cisneros, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Javier Alva Orlandini, Edmundo Murrugarra Florián and Gustavo Mohme Llona requested the full Senate of the Republic to clarify the facts of the Barrios Altos crime. On November 15 that year, the Senate adopted this petitory and appointed Senators Róger Cáceres Velásquez, Víctor Arroyo Cuyubamba, Javier Diez Canseco Cisneros, Francisco Guerra García Cueva and José Linares Gallo as members of an Investigation Committee, which was installed on November 27, 1991. On December 23, 1991, the Committee conducted an inspection of the building where the events took place, interviewed four people and executed other measures. The senatorial Committee did not complete its investigation, because the “Government of National Reconstruction and Emergency”, which came to power on April 5, 1992, dissolved Congress and the Democratic Constituent Congress elected in November 1992 did not take up the investigation again or publish the senatorial Committee’s preliminary findings; g) Although the events occurred in 1991, the judicial authorities did not commence a serious investigation of the incident until April 1995, when the prosecutor of the Office of the Forty-first Provincial Criminal Prosecutor of Lima, Ana Cecilia Magallanes, accused five Army officials of being responsible for the events, including several who had already been convicted in the La Cantuta case. The five men accused were Division General Julio Salazar Monroe, at that time Head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), Major Santiago Martín Rivas, and Sergeant Majors Nelson Carbajal García, Juan Sosa Saavedra and Hugo Coral Goycochea. On several occasions, the prosecutor tried unsuccessfully to compel the accused men to appear before the court to make a statement. Consequently, she filed charges before the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima. The military officers replied that the charges should be addressed to another authority and indicated that Major Rivas and the sergeant majors were under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Military Justice Council. As for General Julio Salazar Monroe, he refused to