Regarding determination of the criminal sanction for those under 18 years of age, the State indicated that article 4 of Law No. 22,278 requires the judge to rule on the need to apply a criminal sanction, and thus this article is in keeping with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, because it allows the juvenile criminal judge to acquit the minor found criminally responsible if he determines that it is unnecessary to apply a sanction. The State also underscored the entry into force of Law No. 26,061 on the Integral Protection of the Rights of Children and Adolescents, because it expressly establishes that: (1) application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is mandatory in any administrative, judicial, or other type of decision adopted with regard to a child, and (2) for effects of the legitimate restriction of liberty, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures must be observed. B.3.1.2. Considerations of the Court 323. The Court recalls that Article 2 of the Convention obliges the States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of the Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 393 In other words, the States not only have the positive obligation to adopt the necessary legislative measures to guarantee the exercise of the rights established in the Convention, but must also avoid enacting laws that preclude the free exercise of those rights, and prevent the annulment or amendment of laws that protect them. 394 Nevertheless, in its case law, the Court has established that it is aware that domestic authorities are subject to the rule of law. 395 However, as indicated in this Judgment (supra para. 218), when a State is a party to an in international treaty, such as the American Convention, all its organs, including its judges, are also bound by that treaty; accordingly, they must exercise, ex officio, “control of the conformity” of domestic norms with the American Convention. 396 324. The Court assesses positively the issue of the Maldonado judgment by the State, which establishes important criteria concerning the incompatibility of life imprisonment with the rights of the child. 397 In addition, the Court appreciates that, in the instant case, the 393 Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 68, and Case of the Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia, para. 245. 394 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, para. 207, and Case of Furlan and family members v. Argentina, para. 300. 395 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 124, and Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 281. 396 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, para. 124, and Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala, para. 330. 397 The pertinent parts of this judgment indicate that: “absolute punishments, such as life imprisonments, are characterized, precisely, because they do not admit aggravating or attenuating circumstances of any nature. This means that the legislator declares, de iure, that any answer to the charges is irrelevant […]. However, in the case of acts committed by juveniles, the situation is different, because, if the court decides to apply a punishment, it must still decide whether it is applicable to reduce the punishment for that for an attempted offense. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to merely indicate the legal definition of the conduct in order to decide the applicable punishment. […] Furthermore, in the case of juveniles, the specific emotional situation when committing the act, his or her real possibilities of controlling the course of events, or even, the possibility of having acted impulsively or at the urging of companions, or any other element that could affect guilt, acquires a different significance that must be examined when determining the punishment. […] Law 22,278 contains an element that does not appear in the Criminal Code: the authority and obligation of the judge to ponder the “need for punishment.’ […T]he reasons why the legislator granted the judge such broad powers when handing down a sentence to an individual who 102