Justice of the Province of Mendoza decided to admit the appeal for review and, based on the content and scope of Report No. 172/10 issued by the Inter-American Commission in the instant case, the chamber decided to sentence Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal to 15 years’ imprisonment finding him guilty of the crimes of aggravated homicide together with aggravated robbery. Therefore, the State considered that the procedural claims with regard to Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal had become moot. 42. The Commission indicated that the State was not objecting to the Court's competence for reasons of time, subject or place, nor was the objection preliminary in nature. It indicated that the facts mentioned by the State were an updating of the procedural situation of Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal, but that such supervening facts did not have the legal effect of limiting the Inter-American Court’s competence. It emphasized that, although some progress may have been made, which must be examined with the merits, the facts, legal consequences and claims for reparations are not excluded, despite the fact that, as on previous occasions, the Court may take this progress into account and weigh the need to complement or specify the measures of reparation based of the progress made by the State. 43. The representative indicated that the review from which Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal benefited does not prevent the Commission or the Court from continuing to hear this case. The representative argued that “[b]ased on the principle of international responsibility, a possible reparation made under domestic law when the hearing of the case had already begun under the American Convention […], does not prevent the Commission, and in particular the Court, from continuing to hear it, nor does it provide the State with a new procedural opportunity to question the admissibility or the examination of the petition or of one of the rights violated.” In addition, she indicated that “the review from which Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal benefited is merely a belated response that has in no way provided integral reparation for the violation of the right recognized in Article 8(2)(h)” of the American Convention. Therefore, the representative considered that the State’s argument “does not constitute a true preliminary objection but merely a partial response to the violations of the rights of Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal.” Furthermore, the representative indicated that the decision of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza “was admitted on extremely narrow grounds that do not satisfy the requirement of ‘comprehensive examination’ derived from Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention,” because it “did not allow discussion of other relevant aspects of the case, such as the assessment of evidence and the accreditation of the facts for which [Saúl Cristian] Roldán Cajal was convicted, or elements relating to the legal framework of those facts, which should also be included as part of the purpose of a new ‘comprehensive examination’ by a superior court.” In this regard, the State’s argument relates to the merits of the case. C.2. Considerations of the Court 44. The State has argued that, after Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal’s defense counsel had filed an appeal for review, on March 9, 2012, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza reduced his sentence to 15 years; thus, it considered that the procedural claims with regard to this presumed victim had become moot. 45. In this regard, the Court considers that a supervening fact, such as the said decision, does not prevent it from hearing a case that has already been initiated before it. Consequently, the Court will analyze the effects of the judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza of March 9, 2012, in the pertinent parts of this Judgment (infra paras. 92, 164 and 257). Therefore, the Court does not admit the preliminary objection filed by State. 18