may violate Article 3 of the European Convention Human Rights, which corresponds to Article 5 of the American Convention. 242 175. Previously, in this judgment, it has been mentioned that article 13 of the national Criminal Code applicable in this case indicates that those sentenced to life imprisonment and reclusion for life can obtain their release once they have served 20 years of their sentence, “by judicial decision after a report of the head of the establishment under the following conditions […]” (supra para. 154). The Court has already determined that this fixed term prevents the analysis of the specific circumstances of each child and his or her progress, which could eventually allow for early release at any time (supra para. 163). Specifically, it does not permit a regular periodic review of the need to keep the person deprived of liberty. Furthermore, in this Judgment, it has also been established already that the imposing of sentences to life imprisonment and reclusion for life for crimes committed when under 18 years of age did not take into account the special principles applicable in the case of the rights of children, including deprivation of liberty as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible time. The Court also established that life imprisonment for minors does not achieve the purpose of social reinsertion established in Article 5(6) of the Convention (supra paras. 165 to 167). In sum, this Court found that life imprisonment and reclusion for life are not proportionate to the purpose of the criminal sanction of minors. 176. Moreover, in this case it must be taken into account that the reviews of the sentences of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza and Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal occurred after approximately 12 years (supra paras. 92 and 94). Moreover, the case file before this Court shows that, after his conviction, Ricardo David Videla Fernández was deprived of liberty for around four years until his death in the Mendoza Prison (supra para. 108). Consequently, for all these minors, the expectations of liberty were minimal, because article 13 of the national Criminal Code required that they serve at least 20 years of their sentence in order to request parole. 177. It is worth noting that, in this case, expert witness Laura Sobredo referred to the psychological problems and difficulties in personality development suffered by Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, César Alberto Mendoza, Ricardo Videla Fernández and Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal because of the life sentences imposed on them for crimes committed when they were minors. The expert witness stated that: “The extreme conditions that these young people were subjected to by State institutions from the early stages of their lives are a clear example of the serious difficulty or, eventually, the impossibility of maintaining mental integrity as far as identity is concerned, and a frightening example of how this situation can end a human life.” 243 178. Expert witness Laura Sobredo also stated that “imposing punishment of an illegal nature has subjected these young men, by their very existence, to a very serious obstacle to their possibility of growing up in a healthy environment […].” 244 Also, during the public hearing of this case, expert witness Miguel Cillero indicated that the “length of time before the review [of the sentence] is considered, in itself, a lapse that ends the hope of rehabilitation and social reintegration for anyone, but especially for the adolescent.” In addition, he indicated that “the existence of these over-delayed review procedures, which 242 Cf. ECHR. Cases of Harkins and Edwards v. United Kingdom (No. 9146/07 and No. 32650/07). Judgment of 17 January 2012, para. 133. 243 1441). 244 1440). Cf. Expert opinion provided by Laura Sobredo by affidavit on August 23, 2012 (merits file, tome II, folio Cf. Expert opinion provided by Laura Sobredo by affidavit on August 23, 2012 (merits file, tome II, folio 60