salary restructuring “was not designed to absorb” the increases owing to application of the salary scale, but “was a response to the rampant inflation at the time.” The representative argued that this was a “factual presumption that had been duly proved during the proceedings, but had been omitted in the consideration and the assessment of the facts of the case, and had not been developed by the Court.” In addition, he repeated that the 1993 salary restructuring “was not implemented as a substitute regime for the salary scale system, but as a need to overcome the situation experienced by the State and SEDAPAL at the time.” 13. On this basis, the representative indicated that he “had submitted specific arguments that disproved the said scope alleged by the State concerning the 1993 salary restructuring.” He argued that the State had not proved that the 1993 salary restructuring had had the effect of absorbing the increases generated by the salary scale system and, to the contrary, “the restructuring had revealed conclusively and reliably that [the State] had attempt[ed] to discredit […] this consideration definitively. The representative added that the Court, in order to establish the pecuniary damage, “could have based itself on the same criteria of equity, taking into consideration, among other elements, the expert opinion provided by the State; but without the unfounded, non-existent and inadmissible limitation of the calculations to July 1993.” In this regard, he added that the Court could also have assessed the expert opinion presented by the representative “regarding which no observations were made, and it was not contested; hence, the State accepted it.” 14. In summary, the representative indicated that, in paragraphs 107, 113, 114 and 115 of the judgment, the Court “has made an improper finding and assessment of the facts of the case, as well as an improper use of the logical principles of the ruling and, therefore, incurs in an error of judgment and defect of substance.” According to the representative, this alleged error had been “determinant, pivotal and decisive for establishing the insignificant amount ordered to repair the pecuniary damage.” Consequently, the representative argued that the Court “cannot permit the anomalous situation of delivering by error and/or defect of substance a judgment with a manifestly contradictory and controversial meaning that also, as a result of this, is an absolutely unjust judgment,” based on which he asked the Court “to interpret the definitive meaning and scope of paragraph 115 and the fifth operative paragraph of the judgment in this case.” 15. The State indicated that the expert opinion presented as a probative element had not been refuted by the representative. Consequently, it affirmed that the Court had been clear when it indicated that “the representative did not object to the elimination of the salary scale system, but rather to the application of a law that, retroactively, nullified the said system.” The State considered that the Court “had analyzed the probative elements provided to it appropriately [and] had ruled in accordance with its principles and the authority granted to it.” Considerations of the Court 16. The Court underscores that, according to Article 63(1) of the American Convention, it has inherent authority to order reparations and, specifically, to determine the payment of fair compensation to the injured party. 5 Thus, the Court 5 Cf. Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, supra note 1, para. 29. 4