33. The Commission has competence ratione loci to examine the petition because it alleges violations of rights protected under the American Convention which took place within the territory of a State party to the Convention. C. Exhaustion of remedies under domestic law 34. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention states that for a petition lodged before the Commission to be admissible according to Article 44 of the Convention, it is necessary that all remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the State may learn of the alleged violation of a protected right, and where appropriate, find a solution before it is examined by an international proceeding. 35. The requirement of prior exhaustion is applicable when domestic legislation does in fact provide remedies that are adequate and effective to remedy the alleged violation. In this sense, Article 46.2 specifies that the requirement is not applicable when domestic law does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right in question; or if the alleged victim has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law; or if there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies. As stated in Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, when a petitioner alleges one of these exceptions it shall be up to the State concerned to demonstrate that the remedies under domestic law have not been previously exhausted, unless that is clearly evident from the record. 36. Based on the principles of international law, the precedents established by the InterAmerican Commission, and the case-law of the Inter-American Court, the respondent State may waive, either tacitly or expressly, its right to invoke this rule. 7 Secondly, the exception of non-exhaustion of remedies available under domestic law, in order to be appropriate, must be invoked during the early stages of the proceedings before the Commission, and if this is not done, the implication will be that the respondent State has waived its right to invoke it. 8 Thirdly, in accordance with the burden of proof applicable in this case, any State that alleges the non-exhaustion of remedies available under domestic law must indicate the remedies that were available to be exhausted and must provide proof of their effectiveness. 9 Therefore, if the State in question does not at the appropriate time lodge its allegations in relation to this requirement, it will be considered to have renounced its right to allege the non-exhaustion of remedies available under domestic law and to meet the corresponding burden of proof. 37. In the present case, the State has not responded to the initial petition and consequently has tacitly renounced its opportunity to claim the exception of non-exhaustion of remedies available under domestic law. For their part, the petitioners alleged the existence of an unwarranted delay in the criminal proceedings and consequently claim that the exception enshrined in Article 46(2) of the American Convention is applicable. 7 IACHR, Report No. 69/05, petition 960/03, Admissibility, Ivan Eladio Torres, Argentina, October 13, 2005, paragraph 42; I/A Court of H.R., Ximenes Lopes Case. Preliminary Exception. Judgment November 30, 2005, Series C No. 139, paragraph 5; I/A Court of H.R., Case of the Moiwana Community, Judgment June 15, 2005, Series C No. 124, paragraph 49; and I/A Court of H.R., Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment November 23, 2004, Series C No 118, paragraph 135. 8 I/A Court of H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment February 1, 2000, Series C No. 66, paragraph 53; I/A Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi Case. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment September 4, 1998. Series C No 41, paragraph 56; and I/A Court of H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment January 31, 1996. Series C No 25, paragraph 40. The Commission and the Court have stated that “the first stages of a process” must be understood as “the admissibility stage of the proceedings before the Commission, that is, before any consideration of the merits […]”. See, for example, IACHR, Report No. 71/05, petition 543/04, Admissibility, Ever de Jesús Montero Mindiola, Colombia, October 13, 2005, that quotes I/A Court of H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa. Judgment July 2, 2004, Series C No 107, paragraph 81. 9 IACHR, Report No. 32/05, petition 642/03, Admissibility, Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral and other persons affected by HIV-AIDS, Guatemala, March 7, 2005, paragraphs 33-35; I/A Court of H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. Preliminary Exception. supra note 6, paragraph 53; Durand and Ugarte Case. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment May 28, 1999. Series C No. 50, paragraph 33; and Cantoral Benavides Case. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment September 3, 1998. Series C No 40, paragraph 31. 6